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IntroductIon*
The chapter on the institutional environment of the labour market was pre-
sented in a new format for the first time last year and again this year it will also 
follow a similar structure. Our aim was to describe policy interventions us-
ing the same set of categories – which also allows temporal and international 
comparisons (Busch–Cseres-Gergely, 2012). The categories were based on the 
Labour Market Policy (LMP) classification of Eurostat and the LABREF da-
tabase of the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN), European Commission. Interventions are categorised in the fol-
lowing groups (the numbering of sections throughout this chapter follows 
the numbering below).
Labour market poLIcy (Lmp) InterventIons
Services
1. Employment services
Measures
2. Training
3. Job rotation and job sharing
4. Employment incentives
5. Supported employment and rehabilitation/integration of people with 
partial work capacity
6. Direct job creation
7. Start-up incentives
Supports
8. Out-of-work income maintenance and supports
9. Early retirement
Mixed interventions (complex programmes)
Labour market reLated poLIcy measures, excLudIng 
Labour market poLIcIes
10. Labour taxation
11. Other transfers
12. Contractual terms of employment
13. Old age and disability pensions system – disability supports
14. Wage bargaining and wage regulation
15. Migration and mobility related measures
16. Institutions for the management and evaluation of employment 
policy
* We would like to thank Leó 
Lőrincz, Andrea Tatosné Takács, 
Mrs Gábor János Elekes for their 
helpful comments, Kitti Vara-
dovics for her assistance in or-
ganising the legal references, as 
well as the staff of the National 
Labour Office for providing the 
sources. Any errors or inaccura-
cies are the sole responsibility of 
the authors.
Target groups of labour 
market policies (LMPs)
Policy measures 
with an indirect effect 
on the labour market
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The chapter provides an overview of all labour market policy interventions that 
entered into force in the period studied–the period between September 2011 
and August 2012. The current chapter builds on last year’s overview, therefore 
it does not present the definition of categories or the expected impact of inter-
ventions, and neither does it discuss the status quo in most cases. An exception 
is the section on the revised Labour Code that provides a detailed discussion 
about the significance of the changes. Related legislation is provided in a sep-
arate section with a view to accurate referencing and access – this is especially 
important for the in-depth understanding of changes. Similarly to last year, 
changes are discussed in relation to each of the categories. There is a new addi-
tion to the chapter: a section on the financing of employment policy and this 
is presented at the end of the main text. This section provides an overview of 
the main methodological challenges of estimating the budget of employment 
policy and data for 2011. The objective remains the same: to provide an instru-
ment to those who are seeking to understand and analyse changes rather than 
evaluate the policies. Although a number of policy makers were consulted in 
different areas, the main source of information remains the Hungarian Offi-
cial Journal, as well as the collection of current legislation.
Labour market poLIcy measures
The foundations of the Hungarian labour market policy were laid down by Act 
IV of 1991, commonly known as the Employment Act. The policies set out by 
the Act are commonly referred to as employment policy measures in the Hun-
garian technical terminology.
Services
1. Employment services
A) Services of the National Employment Service (NES, in Hungarian: Nemzeti 
Foglalkoztatási Szolgálat, NFSZ)
There were no changes during the period studied; the government decree 
on the statute of the NES reaffirmed its role in terms of the provision of ser-
vices. All services were available at local job centre offices throughout the pe-
riod studied.
B) Other activities of the National Employment Service
The role of the National Labour Office (in Hungarian: Nemzeti Munkaügyi 
Hivatal) was amended to include, in addition to its existing responsibilities, la-
bour inspection, occupational health and safety and tasks that the Act on Adult 
and Vocational Education and Training originally had delegated to the Adult 
and Vocational Education and Training Body (for changes related to vocation-
al training see Section 2). In parallel to these changes a significant layoffs at the 
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affected institutions took place: the total number of staff was reduced by 239 in 
2012. There were significant changes in the role of the employment service and 
local job centres as well. For example job centres are now responsible for managing 
community service for offenders who have committed misdemeanour offences.
Main legislation
Government decision 1413/2011 (1 December) on the re-structuring of em-
ployment services; Government decree 111/2011 (4 July) amending certain 
government decrees on the role and responsibilities of municipal and county 
government offices; Government decree 323/2011. (28 December) on the 
National Labour Office and the role and responsibilities of the public bodies 
under its management; Government decree 324/2011 (28 December) amend-
ing certain government decrees relating to the establishment of the National 
Labour Office; Ministry for National Economy decree 42/2011 (2 December) 
on the sphere of responsibilities of (Budapest) county job centres; Ministry for 
National Economy (MfNE) decree 3/2012 (10 February) amending certain 
ministerial decrees relating to the establishment of the National Labour Of-
fice; Ministry of National Development decree 19/2012 (26 April) amending 
certain ministerial decrees relating to the establishment of the National La-
bour Office; Government decree 250/2011 (1 December) amending certain 
government decrees relating to the implementation of occupational health and 
safety legislation; Act XXXI of 2012 amending Act II of 2012 and certain re-
lating acts on misdemeanours, misdemeanour procedure and the registration 
of misdemeanour and certain acts relating to disaster protection.
On-line resources: munka.hu
Active labour market policy measures (LMP measures)
2. Training1
The financing and institutional framework for vocational education and train-
ing changed significantly as of January 1, 2012. In the new regulatory frame-
work, contrary to the previous system, employers cannot spend the vocation-
al training contribution on the training of their own employees. At the same 
time, however a significantly larger amount of European Union financing was 
made available for workplace training – see also Section 10 on taxation and 
the section on the financing of employment policy at the end of the chapter. 
Vocational training contribution provides financing for vocational education 
and training as well as vocational-type training programmes in schools or in 
the adult learning system for up to 100% of the costs. The revenues also finance 
public capital investment for vocational education and training (for example 
construction workshops) and stipends for apprentices in shortage occupations. 
The remaining sum is allocated to vocational education and training institu-
tions via a decentralised system of tenders.
1 This section is based mainly 
on Odrobina (2012).
Changing financing 
and institutional arrange-
ments in vocational 
education and training
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The financing of school-based training also changed: the previous cost-based 
system is being replaced by normative block-funding – 440,000 forints per 
student per year in 2012. The rate is to be set by the budgetary act each year.
The rate of the income replacement allowance payable to job seekers taking 
part in training has changed and it will be paid according to the public works 
wage rather than the minimum wage.
The National Register of Qualifications (in Hungarian: Országos Képzési 
Jegyzék, OKJ) was revised. The aim was to streamline the system and elimi-
nate overlapping vocational qualifications as well as creating a solid founda-
tion for basic skills. In line with the modular character of the OKJ, the list 
and content of each module was published in relevant government decrees. 
The content of vocational qualifications is set out by ministerial decrees based 
on these modules.
Main legislation
Act CLXXXVII of 2011 on vocational education and training; Act CLV of 
2011 on the vocational training contribution and the development of vocational 
education; Government decree 280/2011 (20 December) on normative fund-
ing rates for apprenticeships and other discounts that can be used to calculate 
the rate of the vocational training contribution; Government decree 150/2012 
(6 July) on the National Register of Qualifications and governmental proce-
dures for the revision of the National Register of Qualifications; MfNE decree 
27/2012 (27 August) on the vocational and examination requirements of voca-
tional qualifications under the authority of the minister for national economy.
On-line resources: munka.hu; tkki.hu
3. Job rotation and job sharing
There were no changes in the area of job rotation and job sharing.
4. Employment incentives
The most important change in the area of employment incentives was the trans-
formation of the Start schemes, previously financed by the contribution of em-
ployees and offering targeted contribution assistance. Although Start-extra 
and Start-plus cards issued earlier remain valid, after 1 January, 2012 only Start 
Bonus and Start cards can be issued. Eligibility and the claims process for the 
new schemes are similar to those of previous Start schemes.
To be eligible to claim a Start Bonus card individuals must:
– be registered as job seekers for at least three consecutive months leading up 
to their claim, or
– take up paid employment within a year (365 days) after claiming parental 
benefits or carer’s allowance, or
– take up paid employment after the first birthday of their child while still 
claiming child care allowance, and
Renewed OKJ  
– detailed rules  
and content for modules
Changing Start cards
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– be out of work, and
– aged under the retirement age, and
– not be in possession of a valid Start, Start-plus or Start-extra card.
The Start Bonus card provides a tax allowance for employers from the social 
contribution tax that replaced the national insurance contribution. The rate 
of the tax relief is 27% of the pre-tax wage and this can be applied to wages up 
to 150% of the minimum wage in the first year of employment. Employers can 
draw on the tax relief if the employment period is longer than 30 days and the 
working time is no less than four hours per day.
The card is valid for one year after the date of issue, but up to the retirement 
age of the card holder. Individuals who have claimed parental benefits or car-
er’s allowance are eligible to claim a Start Bonus card more than once – under 
certain conditions stipulated by the regulation – after each period they have 
claimed any of these benefits (i.e. if they were on parental leave more than once 
etc.). However people who are using a Start Bonus card while claiming child 
care allowance cannot be issued a new card after its expiry if they remain in 
employment after the payment of their child care allowance had seized.
In terms of wage subsidies, both the scope of eligible employers and employees 
was extended. Social cooperatives are newly eligible employers that can receive 
assistance of up to 70% of the pre-tax wage. Some of the previous restrictions 
on the eligibility of employees were lifted: people under 25 years do not need 
to be new entrants to qualify for wage subsidy, people registered as job seekers 
for six months or longer do not have to undergo a work readiness test and the 
category of long term jobseekers for 24 months has been abolished. However, 
jobseekers who live with their family are only eligible if the other family mem-
bers are not in employment.
A new form of subsidy for workers with partial work capacity introduced in 
2012 was the rehabilitation card that exempts employers from the social con-
tribution tax on wages of up to twice the minimum wage. People who were re-
ceiving group 3 disability pension or regular social assistance on 31 December 
2012, or were assessed as suitable for vocational rehabilitation or employment 
with long-term subsidy after 1 January, 2012 are eligible for the card. People 
within five years from state pension age and those who were receiving group 1 
or 2 disability pension on 31 December, 2012 are not eligible.
As of 1 July, 2012 people with partial work capacity who are self-employed or 
individual members of a business are also exempt from the payment of social 
contribution on their income.2 Its rate is equal to the discount provided by the 
rehabilitation card. It should be noted that as of 2012 the assistance is paid on 
the basis of potential employability for employees, however for employers in 
the latter group it is paid according to the degree of impairment.
As of 2012 employers with a minimum of 25 employees must meet the em-
ployment quota for disabled workers as opposed to the previous limit of 20 
2 And further groups set out by 
the Act as eligible.
Wage subsidies 
– more people will access 
and be eligible for them
Contribution relief 
for people with 
partial work capacity
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employees. Workers with partial work capacity are counted in the quota if 
their loss of work capacity is at least 50% or the degree of their Whole Body 
Impairment is not less than 40%. For any unfilled quota employers must pay 
a penalty of HUF 964,500 per position per year.
There were no changes in the area of job protection and job creation subsidies. 
However a number of new tax credit schemes were created to counter the effect 
of new income tax regulations that can be regarded as a form of job protection 
subsidy because they have a similar effect – although they are implemented 
differently. The intervention protects those already in employment and keeps 
the non-employed out of the labour market through the effect of expected pay 
increase that prevents wage adjustment. This is discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion 14 on wage negotiation and wage regulation.
Main legislation
Government decree 69/2012 (6 April) on assistance to maintain the real value 
of wages (wage compensation assistance), and amending the Government De-
cree on the expected rate of wage increase to maintain the real value of wages in 
2012 and the value of non-wage payments that can be included in this.
On-line resources: munka.hu
5. Sheltered employment and vocational rehabilitation
There were changes in both the regulation and institutional framework of vo-
cational rehabilitation and health impairment assistance in the period studied.
People with partial work capacity who have been found suitable for vocational 
rehabilitation by the comprehensive assessment, can qualify for rehabilitation 
assistance. This new form of assistance replaces a range of previous benefits in-
cluding the rehabilitation allowance, disability and accident-related pensions, 
regular social assistance, temporary assistance and the health impairment al-
lowance of miners – see also Section 13 on old age pensions.
The National Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs (in Hungarian: 
Nemzeti Rehabilitációs és Szociális Hivatal, NRSZH) was established on 1 
January, 2011 and is responsible for the accreditation of companies employing 
people with partial work capacity and the administration of public assistance 
and subsidies (in the case of wage subsidy for vocational rehabilitation this is 
limited to technical assistance).
On 1 July, 2012 a network of new rehabilitation management authorities 
was established under the supervision of the NRSZH and under the scope of 
municipal and county government offices. Their area of competence are identi-
cal with those of government offices (includes Pest county in Budapest). Tasks 
previously carried out by three different authorities (NRSZH, government 
offices and jobcentres) have been delegated to the new rehabilitation manage-
ment authorities from 1 July, 2012. National Pension Insurance directorates 
remain responsible for the payment of rehabilitation benefits.
Job protection and  
creation: no changes. 
Wage compensation
New network of institu-
tions: rehabilitation 
management authorities
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The 19 rehabilitation management authorities operate in approximately 100 
local offices (customer services) with 620 staff. Their main objective is to help 
people receiving rehabilitation assistance to return to the labour market. They 
provide the same range of services that the employment service provides on the 
basis of Ministry of Economy decree 30/2000 (15 September). For job broker-
age services they use the database of job centres.
People claiming rehabilitation assistance must take part in public works if 
their health status allows. Vocational rehabilitation and sheltered employ-
ment are financed from wage subsidy and cost compensation appropriations 
set out in the budget act. These were 11.7 billion forints and 24.5 billion for-
ints respectively in 2012. The NRSZH will be the beneficiary of the new SROP 
Project 1.1.1 that will be implemented in cooperation with the rehabilitation 
management authorities. The other EU-funded programme – that is coming 
to an end – is still managed by the employment service.
Main legislation
Act CXCI of 2011 on assistance for people with partial work capacity and the 
amendment of certain acts; Government decree 327/2011 (29 December) on 
procedural rules for assistance to people with partial work capacity; Ministry 
of Human Resources decree 7/2012 (14 February) on comprehensive assess-
ment; Ministry of Human Resources MHR decree 8/2012 (21 February) on 
vocational rehabilitation experts; Government decree 95/2012 (15 May) on 
the National Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs and the responsi-
bilities and jurisdiction of rehabilitation management authorities under its 
management; Government decree 238/2012 (30 August) amending Govern-
ment decree 177/2005 (2 September) on public assistance to the employment 
of people with partial work capacity.
On-line resources: nrszh.kormany.hu; kormany.hu
6. Direct job creation
The largest active measure of current Hungarian labour market policy – simi-
larly to the previous year – is employment in public works (see also Section 16 
on financing and funding priorities). This includes short- and longer term public 
works, national public works projects and Start-work demonstration projects 
at the level of small regions. The main features of the programme remained 
by-and-large unchanged apart from working time which increased more than 
four hours per day in the majority of projects in 2012 – based on experiences 
from 2011. It also includes mobility assistance for public works as well as assis-
tance for businesses to employ people claiming out-of-work assistance [the ac-
tual Hungarian benefit is called “foglalkoztatást helyettesítő támogatás” (fht), 
translated as Employment Replacement Support]; however neither of these 
has been claimed (in the first case the incomplete regulatory framework might 
have contributed to this). Public works programmes continue to be managed 
The fine tuning 
of the public works scheme 
continued
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by the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry for National Economy is respon-
sible for managing the public works appropriation of the National Employ-
ment Fund (in Hungarian: Nemzeti Foglalkoztatási Alap, NFA; previously 
the Labour Market Fund, LMF in Hungarian: Munkaerő-piaci Alap, MpA) 
and undertaking financial commitments, and job centres are responsible for 
the contracting and payment of public works employers and employees. Fund-
ing comes from the public works appropriations of the National Employment 
Fund, and the appropriations of the SROP 1.1.2/1.1.4 programmes – for re-
lated training programmes. The demonstration programmes that had started 
in 2011 continued in 2012: in the 94 small regional Start-work demonstration 
programmes more than 1,600 settlements and approximately 66,000 workers 
participated in the first eight months of the year (National Labour Office data).
There are seven different types of public works programmes that local coun-
cils can take part in:
1) Agricultural projects – animal husbandry, crop cultivation or both (provi-
sion of machinery, seedlings, polytunnels etc. for participants),
2) Maintenance of dirt roads used for agricultural purposes,
3) Drainage,
4) Clearing up illegal landfill sites,
5) Organic and renewable energy production (for example switch over to bio 
boilers, the production of grass, shrub and log briquettes etc.),
6) Maintenance of public roads,
7) Winter and other “meaningful” employment (for example preservation, 
drying and pickling of vegetables and fruits, making pasta, maintenance of 
local council buildings etc.).
Agricultural programmes run throughout the year while other programmes 
typically last for five months. One person can participate in only one pro-
gramme at a time. The deadline for local councils to set up new Start-work 
demonstration projects was extended until 1 July, 2014.
Changes in legislation make it possible for Start-work demonstration projects 
(mainly agricultural projects) to become self-supporting and establish social 
cooperatives, and under certain conditions equipment purchased in demon-
stration projects can be transferred to social cooperatives. Currently the aim 
is to establish social cooperatives over the next two years; the elaboration of 
details is still underway. There are approximately 300 social cooperatives in 
Hungary and around 40 demonstration projects might become self-sustaining 
and turn into social cooperatives in the future.
Main legislation
Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code; Government decree 375/2010 (31 Decem-
ber) on assistance for public works programmes; Act CVI of 2011 on public 
works and on the amendment of public works related and other legislation; 
Government decree 169/2011 (24 August) on the Employment and Public 
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Works Database; Government decree 170/2011 (24 August) on wage setting 
and guaranteed wage in public works employment.
On-line resources: belugyminiszterium; nfsz
7. Start-up incentives
There were no significant changes in the regulation of start-up incentives.
On-line resources: munka.hu
Supports
8. Unemployment (job seeker’s) benefits and assistance
There were significant changes in the characteristics and rates of job seekers’ and 
social benefits awarded after 1 September, 2011 – this was discussed in detail 
in last year’s volume of the Hungarian Labour Market (Busch–Cseres-Gergely, 
2012, Table 2). Changes in the current period mainly resulted from changes in 
related regulations, such as increases linked to changes in the statutory mini-
mum wage or minimum pension. Nevertheless the rate of out-of-work assis-
tance and regular social assistance (RSA) was reduced and eligibility criteria 
for job seekers’ allowance were tightened. Eligibility criteria for pre-retirement 
job seeker’s allowance were somewhat relaxed. The situation at the end of the 
period is summarised in Table 1.
table 1: main characteristics of job seekers’ and working age benefits, as at 30 august, 2012*
Type of assistance Eligibility criteria Rate
Job seeker’s allowance (paid 
for a minimum of 36 and a 
maximum of 90 days)
At least 360 qualifying days within three years** 10 
qualifying days correspond to one day of benefit pay-
ment
Sixty per cent of the wage on which labour market contribu-
tion is paid but up to 100% of the minimum wage on the 
first day of benefit payment: 93,000 forints/month, 3,100 
forints/day
Pre-retirement job seeker’s 
benefit
Within five years from pensionable age, has received 
job seekers’ allowance for at least 45 days and ex-
hausted entitlement and within three years from eligi-
ble age, has enough qualifying years for old age pen-
sion and is not receiving any pre-retirement benefits, 
perpetuity for retired ballet dancers and benefits for 
ex-miners.
Forty per cent of the minimum wage: 37,200 forints/month, 
1,240 forints/day.
Out-of-work assistance People of working age can qualify for this if they are 
not eligible for regular social assistance. At least 30 
days of employment or participation in labour market 
programmes, accepting any job offers regardless of the 
level of qualification required and keeping their own 
local environment tidy, if required by the local council.
Eighty per cent of the minimum old age pension, 22,800 
forints/month
Regular social assistance No significant changes Depends on family income but up to 42,326 forints/month, 
if family member is receiving out-of-work assistance the 
maximum amount of RSA can be 19,526 forints/month
* Italics indicate changes from 2011.
** Qualifying days are any days in employment, self-employment or as an individual  
member of a business provided that contributions have been duly paid.
Minor changes 
in the conditions 
of job seekers’ benefits
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The following minor changes are entering into force:
1) The period for calculating eligibility for job seekers’ allowance has been re-
duced from five to three years. Claimants must have at least 360 qualifying 
days within this period.
2) In the eligibility criteria for unemployment assistance the term “employ-
ment” is being replaced by the more general “qualifying period”.
3) Any unpaid leave over 30 days for the volunteer military reserve force is 
taken into account when establishing eligibility for job seekers’ allowance. 
The payment of the allowance is suspended for the duration of the volun-
teer military service.
4) Job seekers’ allowance can be paid from the day when the claim was submit-
ted even if the employee terminated the employment or was dismissed for 
misconduct. Previously, payment in these cases could only start after 90 days.
5) If the job seeker is looking for work abroad, the payment of the assistance 
does not need to be terminated. The reason is that this is not possible un-
der current regulations: job seekers are required to inform the employment 
service that they will be looking for work abroad at least 21 days in advance. 
Therefore eligibility will be exhausted within less than three months of their 
stay. This time is not sufficient to get to the first meeting set out in the co-
operation agreement.
6) Temporary assistance for migrant workers can be paid for up to 60 days in-
stead of 180 days.
7) To be eligible for pre-retirement job seekers’ allowance job seekers must have 
received job seekers’ allowance for 45 days rather than 90 days.
8) If a job seeker is not receiving any pre-retirement assistance (previously early 
pension), perpetuity for retired ballet dancers or benefits for ex-miners, they 
are entitled to pre-retirement job seekers’ allowance. The National Employ-
ment Service notifies the pension authority regarding this. In the future these 
payments will no longer be called “assistance” but provision.
9) If the remaining amount of the job seekers’ allowance is paid as a lump-sum 
for job seekers who obtain employment while claiming the allowance, the 
rules that were in force when the allowance was awarded must be applied.
Main legislation
Paragraph 1 Article 44, Paragraph 1 Article 52, points e), f), h), i), j) Article 
53, points g), h) Article 54, Article 48 of Act CXCI of 2011 on assistance for 
people with partial work capacity and the amendment of certain acts, Articles 
25–26 of Act CLXVII of 2011 on the abrogation of early pensions and on pre-
retirement provisions and professional allowance.
On-line resources: munka.hu
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9. Early retirement
Early retirement with state pension is no longer possible in Hungary from 1 
January, 2012. Early retirement pensions were replaced by non-pension ben-
efits – for more details see Section 13 on old age pensions.
Mixed interventions (complex programmes)
This policy combines a range of interventions for participants. These pro-
grammes are typically funded from European Union sources and are im-
plemented under Priority 1 of the Social Renewal Operational Programme 
(SROP) that includes projects 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and project 1.1.4. These are briefly 
summarised by Busch–Cseres-Gergely (2012) and detailed descriptions can be 
found in the Operational Programme’s Action Plan. Legal changes only af-
fected the financing of projects and they are discussed in detail in the section 
on the financing of employment policy at the end of this chapter.
Main legislation
Government decision 1013/2011 (19 February) on the approval of SROP Ac-
tion Plan for 2011–2013; Government decision 1094/2011 (13 April) amend-
ing certain development-related government decisions; Government decision 
1230/2011 (5 July) on involving the National Tax and Customs Administra-
tion (NTCA) as a beneficiary in the implementation of SROP priority pro-
ject 1.2.1 and amending SROP action plans for 2007–2008 and 2009–2010; 
Government decision 1276/2011 (10 August) amending SROP Action Plan 
for 2011–2013 and SROP Action Plan for 2011–2013; Government decision 
1453/2011 (22 December) amending SROP Action Plan for 2011–2013 and 
Social Infrastructure Operational Programme Action Plan for 2011–2013; 
Government decision 1235/2012 (12 July) on Priority 1 and 2 for SROP Action 
Plan 2011–2013; Government decision 1282/2012. (6 August) on the realloca-
tion of resources within priorities 3 and 5 of SROP Action Plan for 2011–2013.
On-line resources: munka.hu
Labour market reLated poLIcy measures
10. Labour taxation
There were various changes in the regulation of personal income tax that could 
potentially affect the labour market. The most important change was that the 
single-rate personal income tax effectively became a dual-rate system. The tax 
rate is 16% if the gross annual income is under 2,424,000 forints. If the gross 
annual income is more than this, then the same 16% rate applies but the taxable 
base is 127% of the gross annual income. Thus, there are de facto two personal 
income tax rates: 16% and 20.3%. The latter corresponds to the universal in-
come tax rate in 2011 so overall the tax rate for people earning less than 2.424 
million forints per year decreased. However, given that tax credits were abol-
De facto two-tiered 
personal income taxation
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ished the tax burden on people on lowest income increased, while it reduced 
progressively for those nearer the upper end of the tax band.
Those who are both letting and renting properties can deduct the rent they 
pay from their rental income. This might promote geographical mobility by re-
ducing the tax burden on people who manage to let their difficult-to-sell prop-
erties. It is difficult to predict the effect of the decision that exempted hous-
ing subsidies from taxation in 2012: if the subsidies will be directed mainly to 
house buyers then it will reduce mobility, however if they support renting, it 
might have a positive effect on mobility.
There were other changes in personal income taxation that were indirectly 
related to the labour market such as the introduction of Széchenyi leisure card 
and Erzsébet voucher schemes.
There were changes in the rules of simplified business tax. The tax rate rose 
from 30% to 37% and now businesses with a maximum revenue of 30 million 
forints per year – previously 25 million forints – can opt into this scheme. Af-
ter these changes the simplified business tax is even more beneficial to slightly 
larger micro-enterprises with a low cost-ratio.
There were various changes in the payment of vocational training contribu-
tion, particularly the different ways to fulfil this obligation. All those who are 
subject to this tax can pay directly – the rate is 1.5% of the taxable income base. 
Since 1 January, 2012 only companies organising practical training for their 
employees can reduce their contributions by 440,000 forints/person/year. It 
is no longer possible for companies to deduct the amount spent on training 
of their employees from the contribution. At the same time more grant fund-
ing was made available to micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises for vo-
cational education and training as well as adult learning in the framework of 
SROP Project 2.1.3.
The top rate of the value added tax increased from 25% to 27% on 1 January, 
2012. On the one hand, this might reduce demand for goods and also labour 
demand. On the other hand it shifts tax burden away from labour to consump-
tion that, on the contrary, might increase demand for labour.
Contributions increased somewhat on 1 January, 2012: the single pension 
contribution rose from 9.5% to 10%, the health services contribution increased 
from 3% to 4% (see Table 2). Employers’ contributions became a social con-
tribution tax – the rates remained the same. The significance of this change 
is that whereas contributions confer an entitlement to receive a social benefit 
or service, taxes are unrequited payments. Tax revenues are general revenues 
and go to the central government budget, while revenues from contributions 
go to earmarked funds.
Health services insurance contribution must be paid by people who are or-
dinarily resident in Hungary and do not have a valid health insurance or are 
not entitled to free health care services; the self-employed and members of 
Tax relief for those  
who are letting  
and renting properties  
at the same time
Increase in simplified 
business tax
Centralised funding 
for vocational edu-
cation and training
VAT increased  
from 25 to 27%
Employer’s contributions 
replaced by a tax
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businesses who are getting a pension. This was 6,390 forints/month or 213 
forints/day in 2012.
table 2: contributions paid by employers and employees, social taxation
Percent
Social security tax and contribution paid by the employer
Social security contribution tax 27.0
Early retirement insurance contribution* 13.0
Paid by the employee
Pension contribution** 10.0
Health care and labour market contributions health services insurance contribution 4.0
health-related benefits insurance contribution 3.0
labour market contribution 1.5
* Twenty-five per cent of the early retirement contribution is paid by the central budget 
therefore the effective rate for employers and the self-employed is 9.75%. Only cer-
tain occupations are subject to this contribution.
** For both members of private pension funds and others. The upper rate of the contri-
bution is 21,700 forints per day.
Income tax rules already favoured higher earners with multiple children in 
2011; however this has been embedded in legislation since 1 January, 2012. The 
definition of family is set out in the law and it is also stipulated that the public 
should share the burden of bringing up children via two main instruments: 
tax reliefs for families and reduced rate contributions for parents returning to 
work after parental leave.
Main legislation
Act CLV of 2011 on vocational training contribution and the development 
of training, amended by Act LXIX of 2012 on taxation. Rules on personal 
income tax, payment of taxes and contributions and simplified business tax 
were amended by Act CLVI of 2011 on the amendment of taxation-related 
laws. Act LXIX on 2012 on taxation provides for the tax exemption of hous-
ing subsidies. The cardinal laws that stipulate the principle of burden sharing 
for families with children are: Act CCXI of 2011 on the protection of fami-
lies and Act CXCIV of 2011 on Hungary’s economic stability. Government 
decision 1067/2012 (20 March) on social cooperatives sets out provisions for 
reduced rate contributions for the employees of social cooperatives.
On-line resource: nav.gov.hu
11. Other transfers
Parental leave arrangements
In addition to taxation, family benefits are also set out in the act on families. 
The law stipulates that the state must contribute to the costs associated with 
pregnancy and caring for children aged less than three years, and to the cost 
of educating children.
Separate act 
on supporting families
Policy statement 
and nursery fees
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The most significant change was that nurseries are allowed to collect fees 
from 15 January, 2012. This fee is intended to cover the difference between 
the income from normative state subsidy and the actual operating cost of the 
nursery; however it is capped at the per capita income for each family.3 Families 
must declare their income and local councils can award exemptions. Families 
with three children or more are exempted from nursery fees by law.
There were no government-funded capital investment programmes to create 
new infrastructure for nurseries, however SROP Project 2.4.5 provided fund-
ing for the development of day care for children below three years of age, and 
regional operational programmes also supported the development of nurseries.
Main legislation
Nursery fees are regulated by Government decree 328/2011 (29 December) 
on fees for child welfare and child protection services and the assessment of 
eligibility.
12. Contractual terms of employment and changes in the Labour Code*
The literature on the sociology of organisations distinguishes two main dimen-
sions of labour flexibility (Atkinson and Meager, 1986):
1) Numerical flexibility: that can be internal or external, or differently, from 
the perspective of labour market transitions, flexible hiring and firing, or 
flexible working time patterns,
2) Functional or organisational flexibility: qualitative changes to the use of la-
bour (for example job rotation for workers with multiple skills, training of 
workers, improved work processes etc.).
In addition to balancing flexibility and security ( flexicurity), that is a key el-
ement of the European Union’s employment strategies, financial or wage 
flexibility is also considered as an important factor in the wage adjustment 
of companies from the perspective of labour economics. Furthermore it is 
worth considering whether flexibility arrangements respond to the needs of 
the employer (as in the above examples) or the needs of workers as well (for 
example family-friend working time arrangements, workforce development, 
work-life balance etc.).
What is their impact on employment?
From a labour market perspective the two main factors of employment legisla-
tion are protection from dismissal and strengthening the position of workers 
in wage bargaining. These two are not unrelated either, and generally the law 
might cover both individual and collective employment rights (and thus have 
an impact on the opportunities of workers’ organisations). Strict employment 
legislation might encourage some employers – those who are negatively affected 
by stricter rules – to take up undeclared employment that is outside the scope 
of labour legislation. At the same time as the increased likelihood of illegal or 
semi-legal employment, weaker sanctions for informal or illegal employment 
3 The actual fee is based on the 
operating cost of the organisa-
tion. There is no statistical data 
on newly introduced fees, news-
paper reports suggest between 
100–220 forints per day, less 
commonly 500 forints.
* Written by: László Neumann
Categories of organisa-
tional flexibility
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practices are themselves sources of flexibility that must be considered in addi-
tion to the analysis of legislation (Tonin, 2009).
Hungarian labour laws were considered as one of the most flexible by Euro-
pean standards or even compared to other countries in Eastern Europe already 
in the mid-2000s (Köllő and Nacsa, 2005). This is also confirmed by compara-
tive analyses of employee protection indicators that mainly focus on protection 
against dismissal of workers (including associated costs and procedural aspects) 
(OECD, 2009, Venn, 2009).4
Situation in August, 2011
Although the Labour Code that was in force until mid-2012 had been adopt-
ed in 1992, regular amendments by successive governments ensured that it 
responded to changing political and economic needs. The range of issues that 
could be regulated by collective or individual agreement according to the needs 
of employers was increasing after 1995, weakening the strong legal protection of 
workers. Minor changes in legislation during the economic crisis also increased 
flexibility (for example the ratification of reduced working time, extending 
the reference period for working time accounts – the period over which the 
number of hours worked can be averaged to calculate the total working time – 
changing the rules on “orderly labour relations”, etc.). These changes aimed to 
protect jobs during the economic downturn as well as facilitate participation 
in public procurement for companies. However, these amendments originally 
intended as transitional measures were made a permanent part of labour leg-
islation by the new Government after 2010.
Before the reform of labour law in 2012 – in a way predicting its future di-
rection – the amendment of the old Labour Code entered into force on 1 Au-
gust, 2011. This allowed the extension of the probationary period to up to six 
months if approved by a collective agreement. There were also changes in the 
regulation of annual leave. If a worker could not fully use their annual leave 
allowance in a given year due to individual circumstances (such as illness) that 
lasted for six months or longer, then the remaining days could be carried over 
to the following year and used within six months – rather than 30 days as in 
the previous system. Also in the previous system, annual leave could be taken 
in more than two instalments only if this was requested by the worker. After 1 
August, employers can also make this decision if it is justified by their business 
interest; although workers are still entitled to at least a continuous period of 
14 days of annual leave each year. The most contested element of the amend-
ment was whether overtime must be paid or can be compensated by time off. 
In the previous system the latter was only allowed if both parties agreed or it 
was set out in relevant regulations (collective agreement), but from 1 August 
– until the new Labour Code came into force – employers had the possibility 
to make a unilateral decision regarding this. Nevertheless the length of time-
off provided must be at least of equal duration to the overtime work.
Labour market flexibility 
was not endangered 
by the protection 
of workers in Hungary
The amendment of the 
old Labour Code entered 
into force on 1 August, 2011
4 Hungary’s ranking on these 
indicators does not suggest at 
all that the level of protection 
would jeopardise labour mar-
ket flexibility. According to the 
OECD’s Employment Protection 
Index in 2008 there were only 10 
countries that had higher overall 
labour market flexibility than 
Hungary. Hungary’s score of 
1.82 is smaller (indicating more 
flexibility) than the OECD aver-
age of 2.11 and Poland’s 2.01, 
Slovakia’s 2.45 or the Czech Re-
public’s 3.0. For detailed flexibil-
ity rankings of Central-Eastern 
European countries by different 
indicators see Tonin (2009).
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On 1 December 2011 the amendments transposing the European Union 
Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work came into effect. The two 
main changes of the Directive concern the temporary nature of agency work 
and the equal treatment of temporary agency workers. These issues were high-
ly controversial and debated for a long time in the EU and the provisions of 
the Directive will have a significant impact on the operation of temporary-
work agencies in Hungary. As regards the temporary nature of agency work, 
the Hungarian legislator took maximum advantage of the provisions and set 
the maximum duration of temporary agency work undertaken by the same 
user at five years including any renewal or new assignment within six months 
from the end of the previous assignment, regardless of the temporary-work 
agency. Temporary agency workers are entitled to the same basic working and 
employment conditions, including pay and other benefits that would apply 
had they been recruited directly by the company to occupy the same job. The 
only exemption from this during the first 184 days of employment is when 
the temporary agency worker has a permanent contract of employment with 
a temporary-work agency and continues to be paid between assignments, or is 
considered absent from the labour market for an extended period of time, or is 
assigned to work for a company with majority ownership by the local council 
or a non-profit public benefit organisation. (The latter essentially covers tem-
porary agency work within public works employment that was re-regulated 
by a government decree in September 2011.)
Situation between September 2011 and September 2012
The main development of this period was, undoubtedly, the adoption of the new 
Labour Code in December 2011. Major work on the re-conceptualisation of 
labour legislation was commissioned by previous governments before the cri-
sis; however, for political reasons this has never reached legislative stage. It was 
argued that the need for a new Code was justified by changes in the structure 
of the economy since 1992 (the dominance of private ownership, the share of 
small- and medium sized enterprises, the spread of atypical forms of employ-
ment, increased demand for flexibility) and the failure to meet the original le-
gal and policy objectives from 1992 (expanding the playing field of collective 
agreements). The new law was also justified by tasks arising from the harmoni-
sation of EU law, and its Preamble even refers to the European Commission’s 
Green Paper on Modernising Labour Law in the 21st century based on the EU’s 
Lisbon Strategy (EC, 2006) as well as academic debates and legal solutions 
in Member States. These highlighted legal measures necessary to create flex-
ible employment conditions while maintaining the social security of workers.
The main direction of the Labour Code that entered into force in 2012 – sim-
ilarly to the amendments of the old Labour Code – is aimed at increasing the 
flexibility of employment; however it also creates a new conceptual framework 
for this. Although the Government published the proposal in June, consulta-
Transposition of the EU 
directive on temporary 
agency work
The main objective  
of the new Labour Code: 
increasing the flexibility 
of employment
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tions with trade unions were protracted.5 The act – that was also amended by 
the act on transitional provisions adopted in June 2012 – entered into force 
on 1 July, 2012, however certain provisions only apply from 1 January, 2013.
In terms of legal theory, the main innovation of the new law is that it shifts 
the approach of the regulation from public to private law. This breaks the tra-
ditional protective function of labour law that aimed to balance out the asym-
metric bargaining positions of the two sides of an employment relationship and 
at protecting workers in the weaker market position. Therefore the new La-
bour Code allows more scope for collective and individual agreements and by 
default these can even be unfavourable for employees. (In the old act this was 
the exception, only in exceptional cases could these agreements be unfavour-
able for employees.) On the other hand, where the act provides for minimum 
standards (for example the limit for compulsory overtime), these standards 
were lowered. Thus in terms of flexibility of employment, the only limitations 
are those provided by Hungary’s international commitments (EU directives, 
ILO agreements). The possibility or prohibition of deviation from the provi-
sions of the law by collective agreement or individual employment contract is 
highlighted in a separate article at the end of each chapter in the Labour Code.6
The detailed overview and interpretation of the Labour Code is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, and there is also an abundance of literature – aimed at 
facilitating the application of the law – published since the new Code entered 
into force.7 (This seems necessary, though the new law from a legal technical 
point is admittedly – even by its critics – better than the old one, it can hardly 
be considered user-friendly. A number of earlier provisions are not set out in 
detail and their applicability can only be inferred from other articles, the justi-
fication of legislation and related legislation – such as the general principles of 
conduct or the Civil Code.) Therefore this analysis concentrates on flexibility 
measures that are relevant from a labour market perspective and follows the 
typology of labour flexibility in the literature on the sociology of organisa-
tions presented earlier. The description highlights only the main elements of 
provisions, it does not aim to provide a detailed description of legal conditions, 
nor does it discuss the potential impact of the implementation of the new law.
With regards to the flexibility of individual employment, the new law makes 
it easier to change the quantity of labour (external and internal numerical flex-
ibility). In terms of recruitment, the already mentioned extension of the pro-
bationary period is a measure – in principle available to both employers and 
employees – that allows the termination of employment without justification 
and consequences. The new Labour Code retained the earlier provision that the 
maximum length of the probationary period allowed by a collective agreement 
can be six months. The employment contract must give details of the length of 
the probationary period, and in the absence of a collective agreement this can 
be up to three months. If the probationary period is shorter than this, it can 
Re-conceptualisation 
of labour law: 
private law approach 
instead of public law
5 The social dialogue process will 
be discussed later (for more de-
tails see Tóth, 2012).
6 The possibility of deviation 
is also pointed out by trade un-
ion commentators (for exam-
ple Czuglerné, 2012, Schnider, 
2012).
7 Various textbooks (Gyulavári, 
2012) and manuals (for example 
Horváth, 2012; Pál et al. 2012; 
Bankó et al. 2012) provide a de-
tailed interpretation of the act. 
The latter can be purchased in an 
electronic format that is regular-
ly updated (Complex labour law 
e-commentary). Furthermore, 
readers with a general interest 
in labour law might find useful 
information on some thematic 
websites such as the blogs of 
Gábor Kártyás and others, and 
publications targeted at specific 
groups – employers, employees 
(Bodnár, 2012; Kártyás and 
Takács, 2012).
The new act mainly 
facilitates quantitative 
changes in the workforce
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be extended – once – by mutual agreement, however the total length of the 
extended probationary period should not exceed three months.
Employment contracts can pertain to full- or part-time, as well as fixed-term 
or permanent employment. The new Labour Code does not state how many 
times a fixed-term employment contract can be extended, however its length 
in total should not exceed five years. A new, family-friendly provision allows 
employees to reduce working hours by half until their children reach the age 
of three. A new feature of the law is the incorporation of atypical forms of em-
ployment (part-time on-call work, job-sharing, working for multiple employers, 
tele-work, home-based work, simplified employment or casual work). The law 
regulates a broader range of these by allowing the parties to agree on a number 
of issues. Temporary agency work remains to be a special type of employment 
where only the nature of the work or job and basic pay must be agreed in ad-
vance, information about the location of work and other working conditions 
can be provided later.
From the perspective of labour market flexibility the revised regulation of 
the termination of employment by the employer is of key importance. It is not 
accidental that during the preparation of the new law this was the area that 
came under attack the most and legislators were forced to change their propos-
als in a number of areas, such as the prohibition and protection from dismissal 
or termination of employment without justification. Groups that were under 
prohibition or protection from dismissal remained in the new law as a result of 
compromises however detailed regulations changed significantly. (For exam-
ple the rule that allows employers to dismiss members of these groups due to 
issues relating to the ability of the employee or the operation of the employer 
might offer loopholes.) At the same time the new law also allows employers to 
dismiss workers during different forms of unpaid leave (illness, parental leave, 
caring for relatives etc.). In these cases the notice period starts after the em-
ployer has returned to work. The statutory notice period is 30 days and it in-
creases according to the length of service. However, a new provision is that if 
the employee initiates the termination of employment, the notice period does 
not increase, it remains 30 days. Although the basic rules of collective dismissal 
did not change, the rights of trade unions in relation to it did change: employ-
ers are not required to consult the trade union even in the absence of a works 
council. For temporary agency workers the notice period was changed to 15 
days as opposed to the previous regulation that provided for 30 days if the du-
ration of employment reached one year.
In addition to the limitations and procedural rules of dismissal, its costs to 
employers are also relevant. Apart from costs associated with the notice peri-
od, the most important cost is redundancy pay. Statutory redundancy pay de-
creased somewhat. The law still stipulates that redundancy pay is three to six 
months’ pay, but the length of service is calculated as the period up to the first 
Separate chapter on  
atypical employment
Less costly and easier  
to dismiss workers
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day of the notice period rather than the last day. Furthermore, while redun-
dancy pay was based on average pay previously, in the current system it is based 
on the absence pay that is often lower because it excludes non-salary payments 
(premiums or bonuses). According to the new law employees are not entitled to 
redundancy pay if they have been dismissed on the basis of discipline or their 
skills and which are unrelated to their health status. The additional redundancy 
pay for older workers was reduced from three months’ pay to between one and 
three months based on the length of employment. As a general rule the length 
of the notice period and the amount of redundancy pay can be increased by 
collective agreement, however this is prohibited in publicly owned companies.
A special aspect of the costs associated with dismissal, although a highly rel-
evant one from the perspective of everyday practice, is the legal consequences 
of unfair dismissal. According to the old law if the court established that the 
dismissal was unfair the employee could be reinstated in their original job. 
This has no longer been a general requirement in the new law since July and it 
is only possible under specific circumstances. The legislators argued that this 
was justified by the general experience that most employees did not want to 
return to their job and asked for compensation instead. Employers who were 
found guilty of unfair dismissal had to pay compensation and salary to em-
ployees up to the entry into force of the court ruling. In practice, due to de-
lays in court procedures, this could amount to years of pay. The new Labour 
Code drastically reduced the amount of pay for unfair dismissal to up to 12 
months’ absence pay.
The new regulation of working time and time off helps the flexible adapta-
tion of employers. On the one hand, the new law extended the possibilities for 
employers to adjust working time in response to changes in demand. There-
fore the new regulation extended the upper limit of compulsory overtime to 
250 hours from 200 hours. A collective agreement – similarly to the previous 
regulation – may allow even more: up to 300 hours. The work schedule must 
still be notified at least a week in advance and given to the employee in writ-
ing. However, the new law allows employers to change the schedule up to four 
days prior to a given day if there are unforeseen circumstances in their opera-
tion. The regulation of the reference period did not change, however irregu-
lar working time patterns can be introduced using “working time banks”, a 
new tool that allow employees – similarly to a reference period of four to 12 
months – to average their weekly working hours over a longer period of time. 
Such reference periods of “working time banks”, however, can be started flex-
ibly, even in consecutive weeks. This creates a flexible working time bank that 
allows employers to manage working hours on a “quasi-rolling” basis. The new 
Labour Code introduced the concept of “unbound” working time that al-
lows employees to set their own working pattern. This must be authorised by 
the employer in writing and justified by the nature or requirements of the job. 
Risks associated with un-
lawful dismissal: com-
pensation instead of con-
tinued employment 
– lower than previously
Reference period 
to facilitate more flexible 
working time management
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“Unbound” working time is when an employee is managing on average at least 
half of their own weekly working time. Employees working in a flexible pat-
tern are not required to fill in time sheets.
The additional annual leave for parents with children was retained in the 
new Labour Code and both fathers and mothers are entitled to this. Fathers 
are also entitled to five days of paid paternity leave that must be used within 
two months of the birth of their child.
In addition to the extent of flexibility, its cost is also an important regula-
tory consideration. Therefore the law changed the regulation of pay rates re-
lated to different working patterns. Flexible working might be disadvanta-
geous to some workers because they are not entitled to compensation or pay 
for overtime. More importantly, new regulations were introduced for night 
and shift work pay rates. According to the new Labour Code additional rates 
must be paid by employers that operate on a multiple shift basis which means 
that they operate for at least 80 hours per week. This means that they must 
employ at least two shifts of full-time (40 hours per week) workforce. Over-
lapping shifts – when two eight-hour-long shifts are overlapping – are not 
considered multiple shifts. In multiple-shift operations workers are entitled 
to a wage supplement of 30% for work between 6pm and 6am, if they work 
regularly in variable shifts. Those who do not work shifts are entitled to a 15% 
wage supplement for any night work if its duration is more than one hour. 
The wage supplement for afternoon shifts was abolished. For work on Sunday 
during regular business hours (for example in the retail sector) workers are 
entitled to a wage supplement of 50% rather than 100%. Organisations that 
operate on a continuous basis are not required to pay a wage supplement for 
work on Sunday. The wage supplement for working on public holidays was 
reduced from 200% to 100%.
The wage supplement for overtime (irregular working time) is 50% and – as 
a step back from a previous amendment – it can only be compensated by time 
off based on individual agreement or specific provisions. The wage supplement 
rate for on-call working is 20%, and for standby work it is 40%. The new La-
bour Code allows parties to agree a flat-rate pay that includes the basic wage 
and supplements for shift work, on-call or standby work. This does not need 
to be set out by a collective agreement; it can be based on an individual agree-
ment between the employer and the employee. This not only reduces the ad-
ministrative burden but also might reduce wage costs. An extreme example 
would be people who are paid the statutory minimum wage working night 
shifts or Sundays. According to the provisions of transitional legislation, un-
der the same working conditions the flat-rate pay must not be lower than the 
monthly average pay of the employer in the previous year. Nevertheless – in 
the long run and in the case of new entrants – this creates a strong bargaining 
opportunity for employers to reduce wage costs.
Lower wage supplements 
– flexibility at a lower cost
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Some other provisions of the new law also offer – limited – opportunities 
for wage adjustment and even a reduction in pay. On the one hand for time 
away from work employees must be paid an absence pay rather than the aver-
age pay. The absence pay might be lower than the average pay because it does 
not include certain elements of pay. On the other hand the new law allows 
employers to withdraw their unilateral written or verbal promise of a wage in-
crease (if it had not been included in a contract) if important changes in their 
operation would make this very difficult to fulfil or would put an unreason-
able burden on the employer.
The legislator also aimed to reduce the financial risk of employers: employees 
who either “take payments or valuables from third parties or pay them money 
or hand over valuables as part of their job” must pay a deposit. This cannot be 
more than one month’s basic pay. The increased liability of workers for dam-
ages arising out of negligence is also intended to minimise employers’ risks. Ac-
cording to the law that was in force on 30 June, 2012 this could be up to 50% 
of the average monthly pay. In the new legislation – as the main rule – this can 
be up to four months’ absence pay but a collective agreement can provide for 
a diversion in both directions and it can be increased to up to eight months’ 
absence pay. The same liability provisions apply for inventory shortages. On 
the other hand the new law reduces employers’ liability towards employees, for 
example they are exempt from liability if they provide evidence that the dam-
age was caused by circumstances outside their control and it would have been 
unreasonable to expect them to avoid or avert the circumstances in which the 
damage has arisen.
The Labour Code has always had provisions for certain forms of functional 
flexibility; nevertheless the new law simplifies work outside the scope of the 
employment contract such as the re-assignment, posting and transfer of work-
ers. The new law uses the concept of employment outside the scope of the work 
contract for work in a different job, location or for a different employer. Under 
certain conditions an employer can order workers to perform work outside the 
scope of their employment contract; however its annual maximum duration 
was reduced by the new law. While in the previous system this could reach 
110 days per year, or even longer under a collective agreement, the new Labour 
Code allows a total of 44 working days or 352 hours, nevertheless a collective 
agreement or individual employment contract might provide differently.
To some extent the different types of employment contract mentioned pre-
viously also facilitate flexibility: job sharing, employment by multiple employ-
ers and part-time on-call work. The last one is particularly interesting because 
the legislator tried to transfer an existing practice of “zero-hour contract” from 
Western Europe to Hungary, thus the new law is not only responding to em-
ployers’ demands but actively tries to promote the introduction of atypical 
forms of employment. Nevertheless forms of employment that are considered 
Indemnity: 
reduced financial 
responsibility for employers
Simpler rules for 
work outside the scope 
of employment contracts
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innovative in the sociology of work literature, organisational learning and 
conditions for in-work training and professional development are somewhat 
neglected by the new law – this was no different in the old Labour Code. In-
work training and professional development is only regulated in relation to 
study agreements and contrary to earlier practice, employers are not required 
to provide leave for workers participating in formal education – except those 
in primary and lower secondary education.8
An inherent characteristic of employment is the hierarchical relationship be-
tween employer and employee. A number of provisions of the new Labour Code 
reinforce this hierarchy. For example employees’ conduct must reflect the trust 
of their employer to perform the duties of the job. According to the justification 
of legislation this is “the new quality measure of work”, a general – therefore 
extending beyond the scope of work – principle of conduct that naturally fol-
lows from the nature of employment based on trust. Alongside this, the legal 
consequences for a breach of the employment contract were revised in the act. 
As a general rule, sanctions can be set out by a collective agreement, however 
if there is no collective agreement, they can be stipulated in the employment 
contract. At the same time the legislator aimed to counterbalance the weaker 
bargaining position of individual employees by prescribing a new requirement 
of conduct for employers: they must take into “reasonable consideration” the 
interest of the employee and should not cause “disproportionate harm”.
The Labour Code – similarly to the old one – allows for sectoral regulations 
in separate acts. These are most likely in transport and health care, however a 
new provision is that they are not limited to the regulation of working time 
and time off but also have provisions for industrial action, i.e. the level of essen-
tial services and the emergency measures that the government can introduce. 
For example in public transport 66% of services on local and commuter routes 
and 50% on national and regional routes must be operated during industrial 
action. The provisions on health care emergency situations were incorporated 
into the act on water supply and adopted in December 2011.
The act on civil servants tries to introduce some flexibility into public sector 
employment. A number of measures facilitate flexible employment: the amend-
ment of appointments, temporary employment outside the scope of appoint-
ment, temporary transfer, assignment, posting, assignment due to government 
interest, permanent transfer etc. are all regulated by the act. The implementing 
decree sets out detailed rules for the working time and time-off of civil servants, 
tele-working, and public holidays. (The scope of the act covers civil servants 
at both the local and central levels of public administration, the armed forces 
and civil servants employed by other authorities. It should be noted that sepa-
rate acts and implementing decrees regulate the employment of judges, pros-
ecutors, professional and contract soldiers but these are not presented here.) 
There is a separate implementing decree on the qualification requirements for 
Employers must take  
employees’ interests  
into “reasonable  
consideration”
8 According to various surveys 
employers in Hungary provide 
less training to their employees 
in comparison to other Euro-
pean countries (Eurofound , 
2012). Apart from the legislative 
framework, workplace training 
is also influenced by financing 
conditions. In this respect, the 
fact that vocational training con-
tribution can no longer be used to 
finance local workplace training 
is clearly a negative development 
because the Government is using 
this to centralise the manage-
ment of vocational education 
and training.
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civil servants and detailed disciplinary rules and procedures. The act stipu-
lates the general rules of employment in civil service, including principles of 
conduct, working time, pay, promotion and conflict of interest and termina-
tion of employment. Among the general principles of conduct, the act states 
that civil servants must refrain from any actions, even outside their working 
hours, that might lead to a loss of confidence. The act also stipulates that the 
employment of a civil servant must be terminated if their performance is not 
adequate or they have lost the confidence of their superior. According to the 
act, the loss of confidence can be related to the actions or work performance 
of the civil servant, it should be factual and evidence should be provided. The 
employer must state the reasons for the termination of employment and in le-
gal disputes the employer has the burden of proof to show that these have been 
real and objective.
There were no new general regulations for public service employees (such as 
workers in public education, health care and social services), who make up the 
majority of the workforce in the public sector. The only – and far from insig-
nificant – exception within public service was health care where new sectoral 
legislation was introduced with a range of sector-specific flexibility provisions: 
on-call working, voluntary overtime etc. After 1 March, 2012 employers can 
unilaterally impose up to 16 hours per week on-call work, however working 
longer than 12 hours per day in the health care sector must always be consid-
ered “voluntary overtime”, though it is paid. On the other hand the act gives 
an exemption from the application of wage supplement regulations of the new 
Labour Code in this sector. Otherwise – according to estimates of a trade un-
ion in the sector – employees in the health sector would see their pre-tax pay 
cut on average by 8,000–12,000 forints per month.
Main legislation
Act CV of 2011 on the amendment of certain labour related and other legisla-
tion for the purpose of legal harmonisation; Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code; 
Act LXXXVI of 2012 on transitional measures and legal amendments in rela-
tion to the entry into force of Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code; Government 
Decree 135/2012 (28 June) amending certain government decrees in relation 
to the entry into force of the new Labour Code; MfNE decree 17/2012 (5 July) 
amending certain ministerial decrees in relation to the entry into force of the 
new Labour Code; Government decree 136/2012 (28 June) amending Gov-
ernment Decree 375/2010 (31 December) on state subsidies for public works 
employment and Government Decree 171/2011 (24 August) amending cer-
tain government decrees in relation to public works employment; Act CXL 
of 2011 amending Act XXXIII of 1992 on the legal status of public servants; 
Ministry of Interior decree 37/2011 (28 October) implementing provisions 
of the Act XXXIII of 1992 in certain agencies and public bodies under the 
supervision of the Minister of the Interior; Government decree 373/2011 (31 
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December) appointing agencies to perform occupational health and safety 
tasks; Government decree 273/2011 (20 December) on the rates of occupa-
tional health and safety fines and procedures for imposing fines; MfNE decree 
1/2012 (26 January) on orderly labour relations and ways to demonstrate this; 
Act CXCIX of 2011 on civil servants; Government decree 29/2012 (7 March) 
on qualification requirements for civil servants; Government decree 30/2012 
(7 March) on working time and time off for civil servants, administration holi-
days, responsibilities of civil servants and employers and on tele-working; Gov-
ernment decree 31/2012 (7 March) on disciplinary procedures against civil 
servants; Government decree 45/2012 (20 March) on provisions relating to 
personal documents of civil servants, personal documents and labour regis-
tration of other employees in public administration, civil service register, col-
lection of statistical data on civil service, and reserve of civil servants; Act V of 
2012 and transitional legislation and legislation being amended or repealed in 
relation to the act on civil servants; Act CLXXVI of 2011 amending certain 
health care related legislation; Act LXXIX of 2012 amending certain health 
care related legislation; Act CLXII of 2011 on the legal status and remunera-
tion of judges; Act CLXIV of 2011 on the legal status of the chief prosecutor, 
prosecutors and other employees of the prosecution service, and career path 
in the prosecution service; Act CXCII of 2011 amending Act XCV of 2001 
and other acts on the legal status of professional and contract soldiers in the 
Hungarian Army; Act CLXXXIV of 2011 amending Act XLIII of 1996 on 
professional members of the armed forces in relation to the coordination of 
civil service career paths and amending certain labour-related legislation; Act 
CCIX of 2011 on water utilities.
13. Old age and disability pensions – disability supports
Retirement before the statutory pension age was abolished in Hungary after 
1 January, 2012. The relevant act, given its complexity, will not be presented 
here in detail, only the most important provisions will be highlighted. It ad-
dressed three main areas: early retirement, retirement before statutory pension 
age, and other pensions such as artists’ pensions. Retirement before the statu-
tory pension age was available for workers in hazardous occupations or mem-
bers of the armed forces, while early retirement was available for anyone who 
had enough qualifying years. Existing early pensions were re-classified as pre-
retirement benefits – in the armed forces for example early pensions that were 
awarded on the basis of disability were transformed into a service allowance. 
These are paid to those who have already been awarded a pension.
The rights of people in early retirement changed in a number of ways: in terms 
of their legal status, they are no longer pensioners and therefore they are not 
entitled to benefits and tax reliefs available for pensioners, most importantly 
reduced-rate contributions for those who are working. Similarly to people in 
Abolition of early  
retirement
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early retirement in the previous system, they must not work while they are re-
ceiving benefits. However, unlike old age pensioners, they can claim job seekers’ 
assistance but in this case their benefit is suspended. The regulation provides 
for strict penalties for those who work illegally while claiming benefits: they 
must pay back one year’s (or the total amount, whichever is higher) benefit paid 
to them. The benefit will be stopped and cannot be claimed again.
The Government appointed the Minister for National Economy to work 
out the details of the new system of pre-retirement benefits for hazardous and 
special occupations; however this did not happen before the final draft of this 
manuscript was completed.
Pensions and other pension-like benefits increased by 0.5% on 1 January 2012.
Main legislation
Act CLXVII of 2011 repealing early old age pensions and setting out provi-
sions for pre-retirement benefits and service allowance; Government decision 
1356/2011 (21 October) on elaborating the conditions of provisions replacing 
early retirement; Government decree 333/2011 (29 December) on provisions 
before the pension age, procedural regulations for service allowance, perpetu-
ity for retired ballet dancers and benefits for ex-miners, and amending related 
government decree, Government decree 335/2011. (29 December) on the in-
crease of pension and certain other benefits as of January 2012; Government 
decree 354/2011 (30 December) on entitlement to social security provisions 
and private pensions and the amendment of Government decree 195/1997 (5 
November) on the implementation of Act LXXX of 1997; Government de-
cree 60/2012 amending certain government decrees related to pension insur-
ance and social provisions (repealing early pensions). The principles of old age 
pensions are set out in Chapter 6 of (cardinal) Act CXCIV of 2011 on Hun-
gary’s economic stability.
On-line resources: onyf.hu
Disability pensions – disability supports
Alongside the transformation of old age pensions, the system of disability pen-
sions also underwent changes. Disability pensions were replaced by benefits 
for people with partial work capacity. To qualify for these benefits the health 
status of the claimant must be 60% or under and they:
– have had social insurance for at least 1,095 days during the five years prior to 
application,
– are not in employment;
– are not receiving regular financial assistance.
The benefit can take the form of rehabilitation assistance if the claimant has 
been found suitable for vocational rehabilitation (see Section 5 on this) or dis-
ability assistance if they are not recommended for vocational rehabilitation. 
Claimants must be awarded disability assistance even if they are suitable for 
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vocational rehabilitation but they are no more than five years from the old age 
pension age.
Main legislation
Act CXCI of 2011 on assistance for people with partial work capacity and the 
amendment of certain acts; Government decree 327/2011 (29 December) on 
procedural rules for assistance to people with partial work capacity.
14. Wage bargaining, wage regulation and interest representation*
What is their impact on employment?
The impact of wage development on macroeconomic processes – including 
employment – heavily depends on the characteristics of wage bargaining: 
1) the level of collective wage agreement (national, sectoral, or company), 2) 
to what extent collective agreements limit individual wage bargaining (for 
example with pay scale agreements), 3) whether it is possible to deviate from 
higher-level agreements at the local level, 4) the number and characteris-
tics of workers covered by collective agreements, and last but not least, 5) 
where individual market-based agreement is possible independently from 
higher-level agreements. The effect of regulation also depends on whether it 
facilitates or hinders the adjustment of wages in relation to the equilibrium 
– influenced by other factors –, the sectoral structure of the economy or its 
integration into the world economy. Therefore there is no single optimum 
model (Calmfors, 1993).
A special institution of wage regulation is statutory or contractual minimum 
wage that sets the minimum level of pay – even for different groups of workers. 
Generally this has a negative effect on employment, but if the employer has a 
significant market power it can be neutral (Manning, 2003). Another com-
mon type of government intervention is the extension of an autonomous sec-
toral collective agreement to all employers of the sector.
Situation in August 2011
Hungary has a dual system of wage negotiation. Pay for public servants and 
public sector employees – depending on education attainment and years of 
service – is set out in tariff tables in the relevant acts and it is part of the state 
budget. On the contrary, in the business sector wages are set freely – apart from 
the minimum wage already mentioned above – in a decentralised negotiation. 
Trade unions have a low membership in Hungary, and instead of sectoral wage 
negotiations found in several Western European countries, wages are typically 
influenced by company collective agreements (although there are some secto-
ral wage agreements too). However, their impact on wages is not significant 
(Neumann 2001), and they are more common in companies that operate in 
highly concentrated markets or are publicly owned (Kertesi and Köllő, 2003). 
(This topic, among others, is discussed in more detail by Mariann Rigó in the 
section In Focus – II of this volume.)
* Written by: László Neumann
Structural characteristics 
of wage bargaining
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The lowest level of pay is set by the minimum wage that has been different 
for skilled and unskilled workers since 2006. From 2011 there have been two 
additional lower rates for public works employment. Until 1 January, 2011 the 
minimum wage was set through tripartite (employee, employer and govern-
ment) negotiations in the National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests 
(in Hungarian: Országos Érdekegyeztető Tanács, OÉT). The Council also is-
sued tripartite recommendations for pay increases each year, however after the 
Council was abolished these ceased to exist too.9
Situation between August 2011 and August 2012
Twenty-twelve was the first year when national wage negotiations were entirely 
conducted in the new negotiation structure, in which the Government, fol-
lowing consultations with social partners, decides independently about the 
minimum wage and the minimum wage for skilled workers. Although the new 
Labour Code allows the Government to set different levels of minimum wage 
for certain groups of workers depending on the characteristics of sectoral and 
regional labour markets, this did not happen in 2012. According to the Gov-
ernment decree the lowest basic pay for full-time employees must be no less 
than 93,000 forints per month. The two-tiered minimum wage was retained. 
The guaranteed minimum wage for full-time workers with at least secondary 
education or a secondary vocational qualification must be 108,000 forints per 
month. (The Government Decree also sets out the weekly, daily and hourly 
minimum wage.) The significant rise of pre-tax minimum wages (19.2% and 
14.9%) aimed to offset the effect of changes in labour taxation, nevertheless the 
net value of the minimum wage for skilled workers still declined slightly. (As 
has been mentioned previously, tax credits were abolished on 1 January, 2012 
and the contributions paid by employees went up by one percentage point.)
Pay in public works was also set by a government decree for 2012: for full-
time unskilled work this was 71,800 forints, for skilled work 92,000 forints 
per month. Compared to the previous year the increase was considerable here 
too, and in 2012 the pre-tax public works pay for unskilled workers was 77.2% 
of the relevant minimum wage, and for skilled workers this was 85.2%. (These 
changes meant a net increase of 4.6% of the unskilled public works pay and a 
two per cent decrease of the skilled workers). Overall, although the advantage 
of skilled workers decreased slightly, there was still a wage-tariff type minimum 
wage system with four categories.
Due to changes in labour taxation the nominal net pay of those earning less 
than 216,806 forints per month would decrease. To prevent this, in addition to 
the increase of the minimum wage – and following the previous year’s indirect 
intervention – the Government also set the so-called expected rate of pay in-
crease. The government decree provides a detailed list of the rates of necessary 
pay increase to maintain the net value of wages between 59,000 and 216,805 
forints per month (in a table format, with 37 rows). The expected pay increase 
Four categories 
of minimum wage 
including public 
works employment
The Government set out 
the rate of “expected pay 
increase” for low-paid 
workers in 2012 too
9 According to data on wage 
increases above the rate rec-
ommended by the OÉT – wage 
drift – and wage increases falling 
short of the lower values from 
that period show that tripartite 
recommendations had a signifi-
cant role in “orientating” lower 
level wage negotiations and wage 
setting, thus they were the start-
ing point for the arguments of 
both trade unions and employers 
in collective bargaining (Koltay, 
2000).
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includes the increase of the minimum wage and guaranteed minimum pay 
and the increase of non-salary payment; however these can cover up to 25% of 
the expected pay rise. The decree also stipulates that some wage supplements 
must be taken into account, such as the wage supplement for shift work (but 
not the wage supplement for overtime). Employers that employ low-paid work-
ers and implement a pay increase can claim a tax relief on the newly introduced 
social contribution tax; however to qualify for this all permanent employees 
must receive a pay increase. The tax relief was designed in such a way that the 
employers’ burden would only increase by up to five per cent per employee.10
From 1 January, 2012 the labour inspectorate must also check whether a 
company has implemented the wage compensation requirement for at least 
two thirds of the workforce. If the labour inspection finds that the pay in-
crease has not been implemented for employees earning less than 300,000 
forints per month, the inspectorate will issue a decision. Although no fine will 
be imposed, the employer will be placed on the list of companies “without or-
derly labour relations” published on the inspectorate’s website. The employer 
can still implement the expected pay increase. Therefore, even if in a slightly 
weaker form, the previous year’s sanction that threatened employers with a 
ban from public procurement and public subsidies had they not implement-
ed the wage compensation remained in effect. However in 2012 employers 
that implement the pay increase for at least two thirds of the workforce can 
qualify for public subsidies.
In addition to the normative support and sanction, the Government also 
supported employers that implemented the wage compensation through a 
grants system. Funding was available for businesses that were unable to im-
plement the wage increase despite the normative subsidy. The policy targeted 
businesses with a labour intensive operation and a predominantly low-paid 
workforce. According to the relevant government decree employers qualified 
for support to implement the wage compensation for workers earning less than 
215,000 forints per month. The subsidy covered up to three percentage points 
of the expected pay increase and social contribution tax payable on this for 12 
months and it was paid to the employer by the job centre in no more than two 
instalments. Other qualifying conditions included that the average yearly head-
count must not be lower than that in 2011 and that the employer must not im-
plement a reduction of the working time for more than 20% of the workforce 
in 2012. These conditions proved too strict in practice: the programme had 
a budget of 21 billion forints, however only 5.9 billion forints worth of sub-
sidy was claimed. The employment service received 4,094 applications out of 
which 4,006 were funded. According to a communication from the Ministry 
for National Economy the 5.61 billion forints contributed to the pay increase 
of more than 124,000 employees – and helped more than 146,000 workers 
to retain their job.
Subsidies for employers 
that implement wage 
compensation
10 The calculation of wage com-
pensation is based on the same 
logic as that of the tax credit, 
which has just been phased out. 
Up to pre-tax earnings of 75,000 
forints per month, the tax relief 
is 21.5% but no more than 16,125 
forints. For wages over 75,000 
forints, the 16,125 forints should 
be reduced by 14% of the differ-
ence between the actual earning 
and 75,000 forints. Thus, those 
earning more than 185,000 for-
ints per month before tax are no 
longer entitled to the compensa-
tory tax relief in 2012.
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The scope of legislation on expected pay increase does not cover the public 
sector, organisations operated by churches or workers in simplified employ-
ment. Separate regulations set out the requirement of wage compensation for 
public sector and church employers – although to a lesser extent than in the pri-
vate sector because in these cases it should also be taken into account whether 
an employee or their spouse qualifies for family tax credit. Thus, only simpli-
fied employment was left out of wage compensation – and of course the self-
employed who were not entitled to tax credit either. Nonetheless, wage com-
pensation affected millions of employees (based on preliminary data from 
the National Tax and Custom Authority businesses claimed tax relief for ap-
proximately 980,000 employees, approximately half of those potentially eli-
gible by January),11 and its budgetary impact can only be estimated. More reli-
able data was made available by the Hungarian National Asset Management 
Inc. (Magyar Nemzeti Vagyonkezelő Zrt.) on companies with majority public 
ownership. In these companies wage compensation affected a total of 80,000 
workers and cost 22 billion forints in 2012. According to tax regulations and 
the new Labour Code the system of wage compensation will continue into the 
coming years. As stipulated by the Labour Code “the Government has got the 
authorisation to issue a decree on the rate of pay increase required to preserve 
the net value of monthly wages under 300,000 forints”.
The increase of the minimum wage and guaranteed wage minimum as well 
as the wage compensation had a significant impact on wage development in 
the public sector. In the public sector basic pay is regulated by the law and pay 
rates for each grade – which depend on qualification and years of service – are 
set out in statutory pay scales. Employers can deviate from pay scales to some 
extent (in the case of public servants for example, only upwards); however 
the majority of organisations in the public sector do not have the financial re-
sources to pay a larger number of their staff higher wages. In the public sector 
a wage increase would predominantly mean the increase of tariff wages; how-
ever this has not happened since 2006 and in the meantime the 13th month 
pay was also taken away. The reason behind a slight nominal increase in pub-
lic sector pay, despite these developments, has been that the minimum wage 
and the guaranteed wage minimum must be ensured in the public sector too. 
This pushed slightly upwards the bottom half of the salary bands. (To a lesser 
extent pay also increased because of automatic promotions between grades 
due to length of service or staff gaining new qualifications.) Among public 
sector employees, who make up the majority of the workforce in the public 
sector, 62 out of the 140 wage tariffs had to be substituted by the minimum 
wage or the guaranteed wage minimum. For example even in Grade E7 that 
is the grade for workers with a tertiary vocational qualification (but higher 
education) someone with less than 20 years of service would only receive the 
guaranteed wage minimum for skilled workers. Therefore it is not surprising 
Public sector: despite a 
pay freeze nominal pay 
rises as a result of the 
minimum wage increases 
and wage compensation
11 Óriásit bukott a büdzsé a bér-
kompenzáción (Huge budget 
losses due to wage compensa-
tion) FN24, 24 March, 2012.
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that both employers and trade unions have been complaining about the com-
pressed pay scale.
Some sectors in the public sector have had their own pay scales for some 
time, for example higher education. A separate pay scale was introduced in 
the health care sector as a new measure in 2012. The reason behind this was 
the wage demand of junior doctors that was accompanied with high profile ac-
tions (for example junior doctors en masse deposited their resignation letter), 
and they successfully used the increasing migration of doctors from Eastern 
Europe to give weight to their demands. (There had been similar actions by 
doctors in the Czech Republic and Slovakia too.) The Government’s reaction 
was twofold: on the one hand they incorporated provisions limiting the pos-
sibility of industrial action in the health care sector into a legislative proposal 
– on a completely different issue – that was being discussed at that time. On the 
other hand, they started negotiations with the representatives of junior doc-
tors. (From the perspective of industrial relations, it was an interesting devel-
opment that instead of the traditional trade unions in the health sector, the 
newly formed Hungarian Association of Junior Doctors (Magyar Rezidens 
Szövetség) – that was originally conceived as a professional body – represented 
the doctors in the negotiations.) As a result the Government published a decree 
in March 2012 on “the possible wage development of certain health care pro-
fessionals in 2012” and then in June the “health care omnibus act” provided 
for “the retrospective and progressive wage increase for health care workers”. 
This introduced a tiered increase for doctors depending on their basic pay. The 
rate of the increase was 65,800 forints per month for those earning less than 
350,000 forints and then progressively reduced to 10,000 forints per month for 
those earning 450,000 forints or more. The law provided for a smaller scale pay 
increase for other health care professionals as well as those with a non-health 
related degree in the specialist care sector; in total approximately 86,000 em-
ployees saw their basic pay increase. Furthermore, the Government pledged 
to increase the self-employed family doctors’ “card fee” – a flat rate fee family 
doctors receive for each patient who is registered with the surgery. However, 
the approximately ten thousand health care professionals in the primary care 
sector and – due to the sectoral scope of the law – those working in similar jobs 
but in social care will not receive a pay increase.
Together with legislation and national agreements – at least in the business 
sector – sectoral and company-level collective wage agreements should have a 
prominent role in wage setting arrangements in principle. Although on paper 
both the old and new labour codes promote collective agreements in the busi-
ness sector, in reality their role in wage setting is increasingly weak. As has been 
highlighted previously, sectoral wage agreements have always been uncommon 
and their coverage of companies and workers remained moderate. In the system 
of collective bargaining that developed in the nineties, company-level agree-
The health care sector 
was an exception: pay 
increase as a result of 
junior doctors’ action
The number and coverage 
of company-level wage 
agreements is declining
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ments had a more dominant role, and yearly wage agreements were predomi-
nantly framework agreements on the rate of pay increase. Tariff agreements 
– similar to collective agreements in Western Europe and North America – 
were rare (Tóth, 2006). Although in the early- and mid-nineties, during times 
of high inflation, wage agreements had a significant role, in the past decade the 
role of company-level agreements that provide a large degree of autonomy and 
flexibility to the management of companies has been declining both in terms 
of numbers and coverage.12 Unfortunately, the main reason behind this has 
been the increasing interventionist wage policy of the Government. Compa-
ny and sectoral wage agreements in low-pay sectors also declined prior to the 
point at which the rise in the minimum wage took up the resources available 
for pay increase (i.e. 2000–2001 and 2006–2008). It was not only the crisis 
that limited the room for manoeuvre for companies, also wage compensation 
introduced as a result of recent changes in labour taxation implied that there 
is hardly anything to agree on locally in low-paid sectors (as well as the public 
sector). There were further factors that reduced the likelihood of local wage 
agreements: first, the restrictive regulation of industrial action introduced in 
2010 (industrial action is typically used to give weight to wage demands), and 
second the stipulation of the new Labour Code declaring that publicly owned 
companies cannot deviate from the provisions of the Labour Code even with 
a collective agreement.
2011 was a turning point in social dialogue in Hungary: the National Coun-
cil for the Reconciliation of Interests (Országos Érdekegyeztető Tanács, OÉT) 
was abolished together with other parallel bodies such as the Economic and 
Social Council (Gazdasági és Szociális Tanács, GSZT) and the Forum for Eco-
nomic Coordination (Gazdasági Egyeztető Fórum, GEF). They were replaced 
by a high-profile body, the National Economic and Social Council (Nemzeti 
Gazdasági és Társadalmi Tanács, NGTT) that clearly did not aim to con-
tinue the intensive social dialogue. From the earlier system of social dialogue, 
only the National Council for Public Sector Dialogue (Országos Közszolgá-
lati Érdekegyeztető Tanács, OKÉT) has been working on a continuous basis, 
although the influence of trade unions was hardly noticeable during the leg-
islative boom of the public sector reform. While the supercharged legislation 
continuously adopted new laws affecting “the world of work”, trade unions 
were losing ground in social dialogue (and to lesser extent, employers’ organi-
sations too). Understandably, trade unions were looking for the opportunity 
of dialogue, and through the International Labour Organisation (ILO) they 
successfully put pressure on the Government in the consultation of the new 
Labour Code. However, despite this, the Government only agreed to consult 
a selected group of social partners: on the side of trade unions they first con-
sulted the League (Liga) and Workers’ Councils and then included the Na-
tional Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions (Magyar Szakszervezetek 
12 See data from the collective 
agreement register operated by 
the National Council for the 
Reconcil iation of Interests, 
National Labour Office (Or-
szágos Érdekegyeztető Tanács, 
Nemzeti Munkaügyi Hivatal).
New platform for 
national social dialogue 
in the business sector 
with fewer partners and 
without legal guarantees
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Országos Szövetsége, MSZOSZ). The employers’ side was also limited to three 
confederations (the National Confederation of Entrepreneurs and Employ-
ers (Vállalkozók és Munkáltatók Országos Szövetsége, (VOSZ), the National 
Confederation of Employers and Industrialists (Munkaadók és Gyáriparosok 
Országos Szövetsége, MGYOSZ), and the National Confederation of Gener-
al Consumer Cooperatives and Trading Companies (Általános Fogyasztási 
Szövetkezetek és Kereskedelmi Társaságok Országos Szövetsége, Áfeosz–Coop 
Szövetség). The first consultation that ended in a compromise was on some of 
the provisions of the new Labour Code that were particularly unfavourable for 
employees and trade unions, and then there were substantive consultations on 
some of the technical aspects of 2012’s wage compensation arrangements (Tóth, 
2012). During the selective, ad hoc consultations the concept of a new, perma-
nent platform – the Business Sector and Government Permanent Consulta-
tive Forum (Versenyszféra és a Kormány Állandó Konzultációs Fórumának, 
VKF) – was born. The members of the new forum were the six social partners 
and the Government. The agreement setting up the new Forum was signed on 
22 February, 2012. The main forum for consultation is the committee meeting 
that takes places as necessary but at least once every six months. Its members 
are the Prime Minister, the state secretary responsible for employment policy, 
the chief representatives of trade unions and employers’ organisations, and the 
head of the Monitoring Committee. The Monitoring Committee is designat-
ed as a standing body to provide technical assistance to the work of the Forum. 
The main objective of the Forum is to discuss issues of national relevance that 
the founding agreement lists in seven categories.13 The Government – accord-
ing to some sources – decided to provide a 100-million-forint operating grant 
to each member to ensure adequate capacities for participation in the Forum’s 
work. The smaller operating grant and the more limited membership – three 
trade union and six employers’ confederations were left out – are not the only 
differences in comparison to the National Council for the Reconciliation of 
Interests. The Forum has no legal status (for example guaranteed participation 
in the legislative process) and institutional background, and despite the ambi-
tious Agreement, it does not seem to discuss all of the issues listed there.14 In 
addition to consultations behind closed doors, it seems that the Prime Min-
ister continued his representative (and presumably informal) meetings with 
two selected trade union chiefs and the president of the Hungarian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (Magyar Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara, MKIK).
Therefore in the new national social dialogue instead of permanent forums 
and broad participation, a routine of ad hoc negotiations was developed with 
the participation of a limited number of actors selected by the Government. 
On the side of the business sector, it seems that the Hungarian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry had a prominent role at the expense of traditional 
employers’ organisations. A new feature was the appearance of alternative in-
Emergence of alternative 
workers’ representations
13 Megállapodás a Verseny-
szféra és a Kormány Állandó 
Konzultációs Fórumának létre-
hozásáról és ügyrendjének meg-
állapításáról. (The agreement 
establishing the Business Sec-
tor and Government Permanent 
Consultative Forum).
14 The work of the Permanent 
Consultative Forum is not public 
either; therefore information can 
only be obtained indirectly from 
participants.
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terest representations for employees. Some of them used adequate tactics to 
create pressure, circumvent traditional forums and successfully negotiated 
with the Government (e.g. Hungarian Association of Junior Doctors). How-
ever the alternative movement launched by the armed forces in 2011 achieved 
nothing with its demonstrations. Furthermore the compulsory quasi-chamber 
system introduced in the public sector (the Hungarian Faculty of Public Ser-
vice and the Hungarian Faculty of Security Forces, Magyar Közszolgálati Kar 
és Magyar Rendészeti Kar) and by the regulation of local trade union activity 
which is even more restrictive than in the business sector (for example employ-
ers are no longer required to deduct the membership fee from members’ pay 
and transfer them to trade unions, they do not have the obligation to provide 
infrastructure for trade unions etc.) the Minister for the Interior effectively 
made the operation of trade unions impossible and it also seems deprived them 
of the majority of their members.
Considering that Hungary has developed a system of decentralised collec-
tive bargaining and collective agreements are also a precondition for increasing 
flexibility, the new regulation of the scope of local trade unions and collective 
agreements is an important development both in the context of employment 
contracts and wage regulation. As far as trade unions are concerned, an im-
portant change was that Act II of 1989 regulating their activity and legal su-
pervision was repealed as of 1 January, 2012. The two new acts that replaced 
it require trade unions to renew their registration and make the necessary 
organisational and procedural changes approved by their membership. The 
most important changes in the life of local trade unions were brought about 
by the new Labour Code: the scope of legal protection and working time al-
lowance for trade union officials were drastically reduced. According to the 
new rules establishments/premises with an average headcount of up to 500 
employees in the previous year can have only one protected trade union offi-
cial, establishments with 500–1,000 employees can have two; establishments 
with 1,000–2,000 employees can have three, four for up to 4,000 and five for 
more than 4,000. Protected trade union officials are entitled to reduced work-
ing time and they are given time off for the duration of consultations with the 
employer. However, according to the new rules they are no longer entitled to 
time off for participation in training for trade union officials. The total year-
ly working time allowance was reduced: they can reduce their working time 
by one hour per month for each two trade union members employed by the 
same employer. These provisions have been in force since 1 July, 2012 there-
fore working time allowances had to be adjusted accordingly for the rest of the 
year. According to the new Labour Code unused time allowances cannot be 
redeemed by the employer therefore local trade unions with larger member-
ship (and indirectly sectoral trade unions and confederations) might suffer a 
significant loss of income.
Revised regulation 
of local trade unions and 
collective bargaining
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The new Labour Code also represents a radical retrograde step in the rights 
of trade unions. They lost their right to information and consultation – the 
right in certain cases and on certain issues now belongs exclusively to works 
councils. Employers are only required to provide information or consult trade 
unions if this has been initiated by the trade union. Trade unions’ right to veto 
was also repealed (that could be used to suspend the implementation of – a 
limited scope of – unlawful measures by employers). In the future, trade un-
ions will not be part of the electoral commission for works council elections. 
The provision that trade unions can only sign collective agreements jointly 
and therefore each employer can have only one collective agreement has not 
changed. The new act stipulates that the membership of the trade union must 
reach 10% of the total workforce so that it can participate in the negotiation 
of a collective agreement. Therefore in larger, predominantly national compa-
nies trade unions representing special groups of the workforce or smaller units 
might be excluded from collective bargaining. The law puts significant limi-
tations on collective bargaining in publicly owned companies: they must not 
deviate from the rules on notice periods and redundancy pay, and the work-
ing time must not be shorter than that set out by the Labour Code unless in 
order to reduce or prevent a health hazard. Overall, the changes weaken the 
local bargaining power of trade unions, particularly in the public sector where 
they had been strongest.
The act – according to its justification – intends to give a greater role to works 
councils in the regulation of employment relationships. Works councils can 
sign works agreements and quasi-collective agreements – the latter only in the 
absence of a sectoral collective agreement or local trade unions. However, such 
quasi-collective company agreements must not regulate pay which is generally 
the most crucial issue in collective bargaining. Furthermore members of works 
councils must remain neutral during industrial action. At the same time works 
councils’ right to co-decision – rather weak in Hungary anyway – has been re-
stricted by the new law and they can no longer prevent the sale of welfare and 
social infrastructure. Sanctions for employers for failure to provide informa-
tion or lack of consultation have been abolished and therefore – according to 
some – the regulation of works councils has become soft and unenforceable. The 
protection of works councils’ members by labour law has become weaker and 
now only the president is entitled to this. However a positive development has 
been the introduction of a holding-level works council for holding companies.
According to the provisions of the act on civil servants a new self-governing 
public body – the Hungarian Faculty of Public Service (Magyar Kormány-
tisztviselői Kar) – was established on the 1st of July to represent the interests 
of civil servants. All civil servants automatically become members of the Fac-
ulty. According to the law its responsibilities include the representation of pro-
fessional interests, upholding the prestige of the civil service, consultation on 
Overall the law weakens 
the bargaining power  
of local trade unions,  
particularly in the public 
sector where they tradi-
tionally have been strongest
Public service: mandatory 
membership in new work-
ers’ representation
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legislation affecting the employment and working conditions of government 
officials, conducting ethics procedures, establishment of a prize, organising 
professional conferences and the provision of welfare, social and other services 
for its members. The operation of the Faculty is overseen by the Prosecution 
Service. Also on the 1st of July the Arbitration Commission for Government 
Officials (Kormánytisztviselői Döntőbizottság) was to resolve employment-
related disputes in the civil service. Similar provisions apply to security forces 
where the Hungarian Faculty of Security Forces was established. Formally the 
legislation does not impact on the existence and rights of trade unions, how-
ever it remains to be seen how the parallel interest representations will work 
alongside each other.
Main legislation
170/2011 (24 August) on wage setting and guaranteed wage in public works 
employment; Government decree 298/2011 (22 December) on statutory mini-
mum pay (minimum wage) and guaranteed minimum pay; Government de-
cree 319/2011 (27 December) amending Government decree 170/2011 (24 
August) on wage setting and guaranteed wage in public works employment, 
Government decree 169/2011 (24 August) on the Employment and Public 
Works Database, and Government decree 355/2009 (30 December) on the per-
mit free employment of third country nationals in the Republic of Hungary; 
Act XCIII of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Council; Act XCIX 
of 2011 amending certain acts promoting the pay increase of low-paid work-
ers; Act CLVI of 2011 on the amendment of taxation-related laws; Govern-
ment decree 213/2011 (14 October) amending Government decree 138/1992 
(8 October) on the implementation of Act XXXIII of 1992 in the public edu-
cation system and Government decree 20/1997 (13 February) on the imple-
menting regulations of Act LXXIX of 1993; Government decree 299/2011 
(22 December) on the expected rate of pay increase to safeguard the net value 
of wages and the rate of non-salary benefits that might be included in this; 
Government decision 1013/2012 (26 January) on the preparation of employers’ 
compensation to facilitate the safeguarding of the net value of wages in 2012; 
Government decree 69/2012 (6 April) on assistance to safeguarding the net 
value of wages and amending Government decree 299/2011 (22 December); 
Government decree 20/2012 (22 February) amending Government decree 
371/2011 (31 December) on the compensation of employees in the public sec-
tor or in services of public interest in church provision in 2012; Act XXI of 
2012 amending certain laws in relation to the implementation of expected pay 
increase and employment; Government decision 1504/2011 (29 December) 
on the provision of additional resources for the one-off payment of health care 
workers entitled to wage supplements; Government decree 371/2011 (31 De-
cember) on the compensation of employees in the public sector or in services of 
public interest in church provision in 2012; Government decision 1071/2012 
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(22 March) on possible directions of wage development for certain health care 
professionals; Act LXXIX of 2012 amending certain health care related acts; 
Act CLXXV of 2011 on the right of association, on public interest and the op-
eration and funding of non-governmental organisations (Non-governmental 
Act); Act CLXXXI of 2011 on the court registration of non-governmental 
organisations and related procedural rules.
On-line sources: munka.hu
15. Measures related to migration and mobility
From December 2011 the basic pay of workers employed holding the EU Blue 
Card must be higher than the minimum wage. The lowest pay must be no less 
than 150% of the previous year’s average pay in the particular sector where the 
third-country national is employed. Only a few professions were exempt from 
this rule where the rate was set at 120%. The result of this rule might be the 
filtering of foreign workers – it is only worthwhile employing foreigners with 
significantly above average performance due to the higher cost. Thus, indirect-
ly, it also means that Blue Card holders are not competing for jobs with low-
skilled workers. However, this only applies to lawful employment. If foreign 
labour is significantly cheaper than locals, then this measure might increase 
the likelihood of illegal employment.15
Main legislation
Ministry of Interior decree 26/2012 (16 May) on the amendment of certain 
migration-related ministerial decrees; Government decree 81/2012 (18 April) 
on the amendment of migration-related government decrees and government 
decrees implementing Act XXVII of 2012.
16. The institutions of management, financing and evaluation  
of employment policy
The transformation of the institutional system of employment policy contin-
ued at a slower rate in 2012 with changes in the tasks and agencies of the Na-
tional Labour Office already discussed above, as well as the expansion of the 
scope of government measures in relation to employment policy.
During this period the Government approved Priority 1 and 2 of SROP that 
finance the majority of employment policy measures. In addition to a num-
ber of other projects, it approved the funding and classification as a “priority 
project” of SROP’s largest project, project 1.1.2. As a result of the 2012 state 
budget and a series of amendments of SROP, the share of passive measures was 
reduced within the budget of employment initiatives while more funding was 
allocated to public works, training and certain complex programmes (this is 
discussed in more detail in the section at the end of the chapter).
There were various events related to active ageing and inter-generational soli-
darity in 2012. The National Strategy for Social Inclusion (Nemzeti Társadal-
Minimum wage for  
EU Blue Card holders
15 The practical relevance of this 
measure is very limited because 
the Blue Card is not very popu-
lar. “In the first half of 2012 no 
EU Blue Cards were issued. On 
30 June, 2012 there was only 
one valid EU Blue Card in the 
register that was issued in Haj-
dú-Bihar county.” (NFSZ, 2012.)
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mi Felzárkóztatási Stratégia) was adopted in 2012; although this is not directly 
an employment policy issue, it is related to employment policy due to the large 
number of disadvantaged people.
In terms of public policy making there were some important conceptual 
changes that might have an impact on employment policies as well. One of 
these is the establishment of the National Office for Economic Planning. Al-
though the activities of the Office are not directly related to employment pol-
icy, they include “providing support for human resources policy development”. 
There was no information about the work of the Office prior to the submission 
of this manuscript.
The new National Reform Programme adopted in the framework of the 
Europe 2020 growth strategy in the spring of 2012 is the latest employment 
policy document of the Government. The document – largely based on Széll 
Kálmán Plan 2.0 – confirms earlier employment targets (75% for 20–64 year 
olds), highlighting the objectives also presented here, such as increasing acti-
vation, the expansion of employment in public works, increasing the flexibil-
ity of employment, strengthening the dual system of vocational education and 
training. Unlike previous programmes, this one has not been approved by a 
Government decision. Reviewing the implementation of the previous Reform 
Programme the European Commission proposed strengthening the capacities 
of the National Employment Service, the development of pathways out of pub-
lic works employment and increasing the share of personalised programmes.
The Big book of reforms – the Hungarian way to growth and employment lead-
ing to sustainable development was published giving an overview of the main 
changes since the Government’s entry into office. Employment policy is dis-
cussed in Chapter 5.
The Government joined the international initiative Open Government Part-
nership and as a result, the public can learn more about the details of govern-
mental decision making. Parliament adopted the act on the re-use of public 
data, informational self-determination and freedom of information. These 
provisions – in theory – will facilitate access to data for governmental impact 
assessment and analysis and also secondary analysis of the data by third par-
ties. Although further details are not known, this is also facilitated by the pro-
gressive set of provisions put forward by the government decree on strategic 
governance. Although, unfortunately, this exempts a number of areas (such 
as budget, spending of EU funding) from the requirement of in-depth impact 
assessment, in general it puts forward clear and progressive principles.
Main legislation
Government decree 248/2011 establishing the National Office for Economic 
Planning; Government decision 1408/2011 on measures related to the estab-
lishment of the National Office for Economic Planning; Government decree 
38/2012. (12 March) on strategic governance; Government decision 1089/2012 
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(2 April) on the Hungarian programme for the European year of active ageing 
and inter-generational solidarity; Government decree 1430/2011 on the Na-
tional Social Inclusion Strategy and governmental action plan for the imple-
mentation of the Strategy in 2012–2014; Government decree 169/2011 (24 
August) on the Employment and Public Works Database; Act XXV of 2012 on 
informational self-determination and amending Act CXII of 2011 on freedom 
of information; Act LXIII of 2012 on re-using public data; Government deci-
sion 1171/2012 on tasks related to re-using public data; Government decision 
1227/2012 (6 July) on Hungary’s participation in the international initiative 
Open Government Partnership; Government decision 1246/2011 (8 July) ap-
proving funding for SROP 1.1.2 priority project “Improving the employabil-
ity of disadvantaged populations (De-centralised programmes in convergence 
regions)”; Government decision 1235/2012 (12 July) setting Priorities 1 and 2 
of the 2011–2013 Action Plan of the Social Renewal Operational Programme.
On-line sources: kormany.hu
Centres of gravity in the financing of employment policy in 2011–2012*
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely
The above has discussed policy changes in Hungary 
without analysing the impact of individual meas-
ures on the development of employment policy. No 
matter how effective a policy instrument is in theory, 
it will only be effective in practice if it receives ade-
quate emphasis in the policy. This is influenced by a 
number of factors in implementation: the actual po-
litical and economic environment, the operation of 
the organisations concerned and the level of fund-
ing [these issues are addressed in detail by Fazekas 
and Scharle (2012) and ÁSZ (2012)]. This section 
aims to explore – to the extent it is possible with the 
use of publicly available data – how the allocation of 
financial resources reflects the emphasis on differ-
ent policy objectives. Only labour market measures 
discussed in sections 1–9 will be addressed here and 
the non-labour market measures presented under 
sections 10–16 will not be included in the analysis, 
even though these might have a larger impact on 
behaviour than employment policy, and their costs 
might also be comparable (a general tax cut would 
be an example of both). This decision is based on 
methodological considerations: there might be dif-
ferent ways of assigning spending to employment 
policy and the method might depend heavily on the 
objectives of the analysis.
The difficulty of identifying sources of finance
Currently, labour market policies can be financed 
exclusively or jointly from national or European Un-
ion development funds. This duality has implica-
tions for planning, monitoring and reporting as well. 
There are interventions that are implemented on 
their own (for example the Start contribution relief 
schemes) while other interventions are implement-
ed as part of a complex programme (for example 
wage subsidies for disadvantaged people). One in-
tervention might have one or more “measures” that 
are identical in terms of content but might differ 
in terms of implementation. This also means that 
one type of intervention might be found at vari-
ous places.
* I would like to thank Irén Busch, Judit Nagy, Balázs 
Romhányi and Sándor Ádám for their comments on 
the draft chapter. Any remaining errors or inaccura-
cies are my sole responsibility.
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Considering that the basic unit of policy is not 
individual measures – which might be numerous – 
but types of measures, costs should also be consid-
ered at this level. To this the reporting of individual 
measures and types of financing should be harmo-
nised, first of all – in order to improve clarity of 
data – to ensure that they refer to the same time 
period and consider to what extent operating costs 
of organisations can be included in the cost of pro-
jects. Basically, the task proposed by Marczell and 
Romhányi (2010) for the goal-oriented reform of the 
state budget should be carried out for employment 
policy. However, it is only possible to cover all rel-
evant areas if all sources of finance are taken into 
account and all types of intervention are identified 
within projects. Although programme evaluations 
are different in terms of their final objectives – that 
is the opposite of what we are trying to do here – 
there are some similar steps involved, for example 
disaggregating programmes into smaller, compara-
ble units. These elements can then be combined into 
more homogenous units. As will be shown, this is 
not possible on the basis of currently available pub-
lic data. Therefore, the main question is what con-
clusions can be drawn on the basis of available data 
using the second best method.
One of the main sources of funding for employ-
ment policy is the central budget of Hungary. The 
budget appropriations are set out in the Budget Act** 
and the actual expenditures are presented by the 
Budgetary Discharge Act. For the real time analysis 
of employment policy only the appropriations can 
be used, however some caution is necessary because 
planned and actual spending might be significantly 
different (as in 2010). Both acts discuss the budget 
in the same detail, and they are the most detailed 
publicly available documents.
The objectives and strategy of employment policy 
are described in various documents as illustrated by 
Figure 1 of ÁSZ (2012). The budget is not structured 
according to policies but according to institutions 
and its relevant sections can complement the Gov-
ernment’s economic policy documents that often 
lack information on spending. Interventions can 
appear in the document on their own or combined 
with other interventions, assigned to institutions 
or separately. Although its structure would allow it 
however the authors of the budget do not seem to be 
interested in improving the transparency of policies. 
Information about the planned and actual expendi-
ture of interventions in the general ledger accounts 
is not available to the public. Generally, the budget 
combines all interventions in a single unit, the Na-
tional Employment Fund (in Hungarian: Nemzeti 
Foglalkoztatási Alap, NFA, previously the Labour 
Market Fund, LMF in Hungarian: Munkaerő-piaci 
Alap, MpA), which is ring-fenced and managed sep-
arately, although there have been some changes here. 
For example the operating costs of the National Em-
ployment Service (NES) were previously part of the 
LMF, but this is no longer the case. This is due to the 
activities of the NES and some management con-
siderations. On the one hand the tasks of the NES 
changed considerably as a result of the merger of 
occupational health and safety as well as the crea-
tion of the new network of rehabilitation authorities. 
On the other hand putting government offices in 
the centre makes it increasingly difficult to identify 
the actual operating cost of the network even in the 
absence of any major changes in work organisation.
The budget for employment in 2011 and 2012
The budget of NFA is presented in Chapter LXIII 
of the budget act. Table A1 presents actual spend-
ing for 2011 from the Budgetary Discharge Bill and 
appropriations for 2012 from the Budget Act, where 
necessary adjusted for minor changes during the 
year.
Some well-known policy instruments can be eas-
ily identified in the table: wage subsidy type employ-
ment incentives (contribution discounts and the 
normative subsidies of SROP 1.2), direct job crea-
tion by public works programmes (Start work), some 
of the training subsidies (vocational training and 
adult learning subsidies), and cash benefits to job 
seekers as part of LMP subsidies (job seekers’ ben-
efits). Further items are however mixed – in the case 
**  The term “2012 budget” refers to Act CLXXXVIII 
of 2011 on Hungary’s budget for 2012.
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of employment and training subsidies even their 
name suggest the duality of objectives. According 
to this table the budget for the employment policy 
was around 300 billion forints in both years.
table a1: nFa (previously mpa) spending in the budget, harmonised data
Amount (billion forints)
Share
Increase
(percentage)
2011 2012 2011 2012 2012/2011
Active measures 30.923 31.600 10.9 10.3 2.2
  Employment and training subsidies 25.775 25.600 9.1 8.3 –0.7
  Reimbursement of contribution discount 5.148 6.000 1.8 2.0 16.6
Vocational training and adult learning subsidies 27.921 23.483 9.8 7.6 –15.9
Expenditure on passive measures 125.765 58.700 44.3 19.1 –53.3
  Job seekers’ assistance 124.543 57.000 43.9 18.5 –54.2
  Transfer to Pension Insurance Fund 1.222 1.700 0.4 0.6 39.2
Wage guarantee payments 5.363 6.000 1.9 2.0 11.9
Operating costs 0.087 0.300 0.0 0.1 246.0
Start Employment Programme (2011: public works) 59.800 132.183 21.1 43.0 121.0
Retention balance and risk management allocation 0.000 2.000 0.0 0.7
EU pre- and co-financing 33.500 53.367 11.8 17.3 59.3
  SROP 1.1 Employment services and assistance 19.754 37.900 7.0 12.3 91.9
  SROP 1.2 Normative employment incentives 9.775 8.500 3.4 2.8 –13.0
  EU co-financing for employability and adaptability 3.971 6.967 1.4 2.3 75.5
Other 0.304 0.0 0.1 0.0
Total 283.662 307.632 100.0 100.0 8.5
Note: 2011 data are final numbers from the budgetary discharge while 2012 indicated planned expenditure at 
current value. In 2011 the Fund was called the Labour Market Fund, in 2012 the National Employment Fund. At 
the end of January, 2013 one euro was equivalent to approximately 290 Hungarian forints.
Source: Bill on the “Implementation of Act CLXIX of 2010 on the 2011 budget of the Republic of Hungary” 
(budgetary discharge, Annex 1) Act CLXXXVIII of 2011, Hungarian Official Gazette, Year 2011, number 161, 
p. 39 337.
Nevertheless the NFA does not include the total 
budget of the employment policy; however based on 
the institutional structure of the employment policy 
other sources can be identified in other parts of the 
state budget. As has already been mentioned, since 
1 January 2011 operating costs have no longer been 
included in the NFA, such as the operating costs of 
the National Employment Service. The appropria-
tion for its central coordination unit, the Nation-
al Labour Office, can be found under Heading 4, 
Chapter 15 of the Ministry for National Economy 
(p 39,313) – the structure is less relevant here, how-
ever the budget of 4.7 billion forints is and should be 
added to the above sum. The implementing bodies 
of the NES are made up of local job centres that now 
operate as part of government offices and thus they 
are not listed separately in the budget. They are part 
of the 107-billion-forint appropriation under Head-
ing 8 (Chapter 10) of the Ministry of Public Admin-
istration and Justice but their share is not known 
and would be difficult to calculate. The budget of 
the former Employment Service, minus the NLO, 
that amounted to approximately 20 billion forints 
might help to estimate their current budget. Simi-
larly the operating cost of the State Secretariat for 
Employment Policy could be included here (if it were 
known, but it is not because it is not listed separately 
in the 6.8 billion forints appropriation under Head-
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ing 1, Chapter 15), or the State Secretariat of Pub-
lic Works in the Ministry of Interior (again cannot 
be identified within the total budget of 3.8 billion 
forints of the Ministry), or the approximately 0.4 
billion budget of the National Employment Public 
Non-profit Ltd. Of course the list could continue 
and include for example the operating grant (0.5 
billion forints) to the Hungarian Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry that plays an important role in 
vocational education and training, or the 4.5-bil-
lion-forint budget of the István Türr Training and 
Research Institute that takes part in the training 
and education of public workers, or more impor-
tantly the National Office for Rehabilitation and 
Social Affairs and related rehabilitation authorities 
with their budget of more than 4 billion forints. Al-
though this is not an exhaustive list – due to the un-
certain status of some institutions, it cannot be ex-
haustive – it identifies the most important missing 
items. If these are all included then the nationally 
financed employment policy budget was approxi-
mately 340 billion forints in 2012.
The share of employment policy within the state 
budget increased only slightly by 2012 but its struc-
ture changed significantly. In 2011 a large part – just 
over 40% – of the budget was made up of passive 
benefits. In second place was public works with ap-
proximately 20% of the budget and lastly the share 
of other active assistance, vocational training and 
EU-funded complex programmes was around 10%. 
This changed in 2012. In addition to a moderate in-
crease in the share of complex programmes and a 
similar decline in the direct financing of vocational 
training, the planned share of passive benefits and 
public works switched places. Nevertheless it would 
be premature to make any final conclusions about 
changes in the weight of vocational training: as will 
be shown, the sum available for similar purposes in 
SROP 2.1.3 increased to a similar extent, and this 
might not be a coincidence.
Although Table A1 and its discussion include the 
EU-funded programmes of the NFA, it does not list 
all of these sources. The spending of EU funds is 
based on operational programmes such as the Social 
Renewal Operational Programme (SROP). Opera-
tional programmes are broken down into priorities 
and each priority includes measures and projects. 
There are a number of projects in the operational 
programmes that have primary or secondary ob-
jectives related to employment policy. This is espe-
cially the case for SROP – Priority 1 and 2 include 
projects that are clearly and directly based on em-
ployment policy instruments. Projects under Prior-
ity 5 combine social policy and employment policy 
objectives. In principle, there might be employment 
policy elements in the Social Infrastructure Oper-
ational Programmes (SIOP) as well, that is closely 
related to SROP.
It is related to the administration of projects, how-
ever it is of key importance here, that two groups can 
be distinguished based on funding. In some projects 
(they are the majority) funding closely follows the 
availability of money, and there are projects that are 
pre-financed by the NFA (MpA) before the availa-
bility of EU funding, therefore the money appears 
in its budget. Although these projects in Priority 
1 are large in terms of their budget, nevertheless 
they do not cover most of the policy budget. When 
considering these, we need to take into account the 
fact that due to the system of pre-financing and the 
reimbursement of money later, appropriations in a 
given year might be related to a completely differ-
ent project phase.
Apart from SROP and SIOP, it is not possible to 
rely on the title of projects, there needs to be some 
form of content analysis to decide whether there are 
employment policy related projects in other opera-
tional programmes as well. Here the simplest meth-
od was used: we searched for the strings “foglal” 
(“empl*”) and “munkahely” (“job”) in the text of 
action plans that set out the content of operational 
programmes at the level of projects and listed the 
projects where the title or the description contained 
either or both of these terms. Of course, this meth-
od has its weaknesses, however for a more detailed 
analysis all calls for proposals should be reviewed in-
dividually. This method revealed that there are pro-
jects with employment policy objectives in Priority 
2 and 3 of the Economic Development Operation-
al Programme (EDOP) and also in regional (plan-
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ning regions) operational programmes. Although 
the latter do not identify employment policy objec-
tives explicitly, they highlight the importance of job 
creation. The Environment and Energy Operational 
Programme (EEOP) and the Transport Operational 
Programme (TOP) do not contain any form of the 
words job or employment. Projects identified using 
the above method are presented in Table A2. The 
first column displays the code of the project and 
the last column provides a brief description. The 
projects of regional operational programmes are 
not included in the table because the share of em-
ployment policy compared to other projects would 
be even more difficult to identify.
table a2: Labour market programmes outside the nFa (mpa) financed by the eu;  
maximum amount of commitment according to indicative resource allocation (billion forints)
OP priority, 
interventions
April 2011 December 
2011, total
August 2012
Abbreviated name/reference in the action plan11 12 13 total 11 12 13 total
Priority 2, EDOP 54.0 54.0 54.0
2.1.3 45.0 45.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 45.0 Complex technology development and employment
2.2.4 9.0 9.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 9.0 SME job creation
Priority 2, EDOP 27.0 27.0 27.0
3.3.2 27.0 27.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 27.0 Competitiveness programme,  
“… wage costs of new workers”
Priority 3, SIOP 6.0 6.0 6.0
3.2.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 “The project aims to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of active labour market policies…”
Priority 1, SROP 118.3 126.7 158.5
1.1.1 21.7 21.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 Rehabilitation and employment of people with 
partial work capacity
1.1.2 60.0 60.0 86.0 86.0 20.0 106.0 Decentralised complex programme for disadvan-
taged people
1.1.4 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 7.0 1.1.2 Central Hungary region equivalent
1.2.1 8.5 8.5 7.4 14.5 14.5 Start Plus and Extra
1.3.1 7.0 7.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 NES development
1.4.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.5 4.5 1.5 5.0 6.5 Assistance to community-based employment  
projects
1.4.3 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.7 4.7 4.7 Employment pilot programmes
1.4.5 1.4 1.0 1.0 3.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 Employment pacts
1.4.6 2.0 1.2 1.0 4.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 Transitional employment in the construction  
industry
1.4.7 0.7 0.7 Professional development related to employment 
programmes
Priority 2, SROP 109.8 116.9 130.1
2.1.2 9.0 9.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 Foreign language and IT competencies
2.1.3 2.5 3.3 2.0 7.8 21.0 7.8 13.2 21.0 Workplace training
2.1.6 19.8 19.8 20.1 20.1 20.1 “Studying again”
2.2.1 4.7 4.7 4.7 5.6 5.6 Development of the content of vocational training
2.2.4 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 Cross-border cooperation
2.2.5 4.5 4.5 Development of vocational training institutions
2.2.6 1.4 1.4 Training and professional development of teachers 
in vocational education and training
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OP priority, 
interventions
April 2011 December 
2011, total
August 2012
Abbreviated name/reference in the action plan11 12 13 total 11 12 13 total
2.2.7 11.4 11.4 Developments related to the dual system of voca-
tional training
2.3.4 20.0 20.0 20.0 60.0 18.0 Supporting hiring in SMEs
2.3.4.A 8.5 8.5 Supporting students with study agreements
2.3.4.B 1.2 1.2 Professional development of tutors
2.3.6. 6.9 6.9 6.9 Supporting business start-up among young people
2.4.3.D 15.0 15.0 15.0 Development of social economy
2.4.3.E 0.8 0.8 Development of non-government organisation in the 
social economy
2.4.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 6.0 8.0 10.4 10.4 Development of day care provision for young chil-
dren at the workplace
2.4.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 Health and safety at work
2.5.3 3.9 3.9 3.9 Economic and social cooperation
2.6.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 Support to non-governmental service providers
Priority 5, SROP 30.8 32.6 32.6
5.1.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Supporting projects in multiple disadvantaged small 
regions
5.3.1 4.9 4.9 3.3 3.3 Enabling and development of independent living 
skills for people with low employability
5.3.1-B-1 1.5 1.5 Work-based training of Roma people in the social 
care and child welfare system
5.3.1-B-2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 Work-based training of Roma people in the social 
care and child welfare system
5.3.2 1.1 1.1 0.1 0.1 Technical and methodological assistance to the 
programme “Supporting the social and labour mar-
ket re-integration of homeless people who are 
sleeping rough”
5.3.3. 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 Supporting the social and labour market re-integra-
tion of homeless people who are sleeping rough
5.3.8. 19.4 19.4
5.3.8-A 9.6 9.6 Motivational training and support services to im-
prove the labour market prospects of the most 
disadvantaged
5.3.8-B 7.3 7.3 Motivational training and support services to im-
prove the labour market prospects of the most 
disadvantaged
5.3.9 2.0 2.0 Study partnerships to improve employability
5.3.10 3.3 3.3 Enable/motivational training, support services to 
prepare the most disadvantaged to successfully 
take part in traditional training/employment pro-
grammes
Total without 1.1 and 1.2 250.0 253.0 269.0
Total 346.0 363.0 408.0
Source: April 2011 figures: 1094/2011 (13 April), changes: Government decision 1453/2011 (22 December) and 
Government decision 1235/2012 (12 July), and the Action Plans of the New Széchenyi Programme for the other 
SROP priorities and action plans.
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In order to link Table A2 to the budget, at least the 
planned schedule of spending should be available 
for each identified programme; however this was 
not the case. Although relatively detailed infor-
mation is available about projects funded from EU 
sources and they can also be closely followed up to 
the publication of calls for proposals, very little is 
known about actual spending particularly in the 
disbursement phase. The Action Plans for the peri-
od 2011–2013 set out the indicative annual budget 
for each project – the figures for each amendment 
of the action plan are displayed in the middle col-
umns of Table A2. However, these data do not pro-
vide any information about implementation either. 
On the one hand, this is natural: actual spending 
depends on many unforeseeable factors, including 
the timing of calls for proposals and the submission 
of projects. On the other hand, this is limited by the 
type of documentation that does not record the dis-
bursement following – sometimes years after – con-
tracting. Although actual implementation is closely 
monitored by the National Development Agency, 
the information is not published. According to ex-
perts, this information is not included in Monitor-
ing Reports that are not public documents either. In-
stead, data aggregated by priority are reported. This 
is an additional difficulty for projects that are no 
longer included in the current action plans because 
although payment is still on-going, new contracts 
for implementation are not signed. Thus, there is 
no information about costs of individual projects 
even after their conclusion. Therefore there is lim-
ited knowledge about the implementation of larger 
units. Assuming that the available budget will be 
spent and items carried over are disregarded, one 
might argue that the total budget available for la-
bour market policies is at least 90 billion forints per 
year larger than that estimated on the basis of the 
state budget. This is a considerable sum in itself, but 
compared to the budget of approximately 340 bil-
lion forints, it is very significant: nearly its quarter. 
Therefore the estimated sum for labour market poli-
cies is around 430 billion forints that is 40% higher 
than that based only on NFA sources.
Even if we cannot analyse the schedule and the 
current policy structure– mainly due to items car-
ried over in the budget – the action plan gives an ac-
curate picture of policy changes. Columns 2–5 re-
flect the situation in April 2011***, then two changes 
show the effects of the comprehensive amendment 
of SROP and TIOP in the winter of 2011, and 
amendment of SROP Priority 1 and 2 in the sum-
mer of 2012. The contribution of other operation-
al programmes is set at 87 billion forints. The to-
tal available budget increased by about 50 billion 
forints as a result of these changes which is mainly 
due to the nearly 20 billion forints increase two 
times in the budget of complex project 1.1.2, and 
on the other hand, to a lesser degree, the increase 
in funding available for Start schemes, vocational 
training, workplace training, including addition-
ally some new schemes. Finally there are a fairly 
large number of new schemes in areas related to the 
social economy, day-care for children etc. The sum 
originally available for the modernisation of NES 
was significantly reduced, or rather re-allocated 
to SIOP Priority 3.2.1, and funding available for 
vocational rehabilitation in Project 1.1.1 was also 
reduced. The programme supporting SMEs to hire 
new workers (SROP 2.3.4), which was originally 
allocated 60 billion forints, was scrapped. Also for 
projects that retained all or most of the original 
budget, there was some re-allocation of resources, 
typically from 2011 to 2012 – this might have been 
due to unsuccessful calls for proposals or difficul-
ties of co-financing.
Conclusions
Hopefully the above has shown the type of informa-
tion that would be needed for a detailed overview of 
the budget for labour market policies. Firstly, taking 
stock of labour market spending in the state budget 
*** At the beginning of 2011 SROP had two general 
revisions in January and April as a result of govern-
ment decisions 1013/2011 (9 January) and 1094/2011 
(13 April). Then there were various minor amend-
ments such as changes in priorities 3, 4 and 6. The 
table indicates this version.
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(this is nearly happening), and details on the main 
budget titles. The latter would be partly doable on 
the basis of treasury accounts. Projects funded by 
the EU pose more of a problem. Here a more detailed 
analysis of their content would be necessary, simi-
larly to other types of projects, and of an adequate 
scale so that all potential sources are considered. On 
the other hand, actual figures would be necessary 
that indicate not only the planned but the actual 
cost of projects. This would be the only way to find 
out to what extent employment policy applied dif-
ferent types of measures.
Nonetheless, it is not without purpose to collate 
all available information because it provides an ap-
proximate picture of the role of individual measures 
in employment policy – changing over the years – 
and thus it helps to show the real significance of 
interventions.
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